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ABSTRACT
We report on a study of the comparison of two reimbursement methods,
capitation (CAP) and fee for service (FFS), as well as mixed payment, with respect to the
implementation of the ADA recommendations for Diabetes Type 2 (DM2) management
and referral rates for specialist health care in the outpatient setting of the United States.
Our purpose in examining these specific topics is to determine whether there is any
difference in the implementation of the ADA recommendations or the frequency of
referral between visits paid under CAP vs under FFS because both quality and cost of
healthcare is affected by these two payment types. We applied Agency Theory combined
with Donabedian’s Theory to these topics as it relates to behavioral change in response to
financial incentives. Our sample was a pooled cross-section of data from the 2014 and
2015 National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys (NAMCS). We analyzed the weighted
data using both patient, physician, and payer characteristics We hypothesized that visits
that were paid under CAP would be less likely to implement ADA recommendations in
the management of DM2 and more likely to be referred to specialists than those paid
under FFS. Our analysis regression tested our hypotheses and the results demonstrated
that the estimated average of applying ADA recommendations for visits under CAP is 0.5
recommendations less than visits under FFS (P<0.05), controlling for other provider,
patient, and payer variables. Moreover, the estimated average application of ADA
recommendation for visits under mixed payment is 0.5 more than visit under FFS
(P=0.08), controlling for other provider, patient, and payer variables. From the analysis
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using multiple logistic regression, compared to primary care visits that are under FFS
plans, visits that are under CAP have 124 % increased odds of referral visits to specialists
(OR=2.24, 95% CI 1.12 - 4.49, P=0.02). We conclude that the method of primary care
remuneration is associated with both implementation of ADA recommendations and
referral rates.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1. Background and significance
1.1 Introduction:
As healthcare costs continue to rise in the U.S. there is a need to find strategies
for containing costs while still delivering quality care. The most common reimbursement
method among health insurance plans is still fee for service (FFS) [89], but both private
insurers and public payers have sought alternative methods to bring down the cost of
healthcare. Economists posit that payment systems have an association with the behavior
of physicians [1, 2], for example FFS payment method reimburses physicians for each
service provided thus incentivizing overutilization while CAP reimburses a fixed amount
per patient per time period such as per month thus incentivizing underutilization [25,37].
Following economic theory, one focus of lowering costs has been to shift reimbursement
away from FFS to alternative means such as capitation (CAP), salaried, or blended
payments [3,5]. The challenge is to find the right combination of economic motivations
that result in the highest quality of care for the patient and greatest physician acceptance
while lowering costs. At the present time policy makers and payers view CAP as one
good alternative to the status quo of FFS [6].
Some studies and hypotheses proposed that CAP payments show reductions in the
provision of health care services in general since physicians with a higher percentage of
patients covered under CAP payments may underutilize services for patients which could
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mean either more efficient use of services or lower quality of care, while
physicians with a higher percentage of patients covered under FFS on the other hand are
relatively more likely to over-utilize services which may lead to unnecessary use of
services, less efficiency, but higher quality of care [25, 37].
More empirical studies are needed on the relationship of quality of care to
physician reimbursement methods because most of the studies to date have been
conceptualized based on quantity of utilization of services [6]. This study of physician
practice characteristics is needed to show definitively whether and to what extent the care
received by patients is related to primary care physician (PCP) payment methods because
policies are in place that are based on assumptions about PCP behavior without empirical
evidence. We use Agency Theory and Donabedian’s Model under Quality Theory to
analyze the association of payment and physician behavior. According to agency theory,
behavior and motivation are affected by financial incentives and there is an asymmetry in
knowledge as the payers do not have full access to what is happening between physician
and patient during a visit [19]. Under this theory, physicians are the agents and payers are
the principals and the principals desire an outcome that minimizes costs which are
created by the agents. The application of agency theory here is to compare the method of
reimbursement to PCPs in relation to utilization of healthcare services by assessing
provision of quality management of diabetic patients and the rate of referral to specialists
of visits paid under CAP vs FFS. This study assessed the association between CAP and
FFS payment methods quality management of diabetic patients for our first aim and the
frequency rates of outpatient visits referred to specialists by PCPs for our second aim.
The Donabedian Model is composed of three corners: structure, process, and outcome
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[75]. We applied simulated Donabedian Model on physician level instead of on patient
level as in figure 3.1.
Optimizing reimbursement strategies for PCPs is critical for accomplishing our
aims because PCP services have the greatest impact on healthcare quality [7-9]. Many
reimbursement methods have been tried such as FFS, CAP, salary, and blended methods,
but none have been effective for both cost containment and quality of care [5]. There are
many problems in primary health care especially when it comes to access to PCPs in
many areas of the U.S. On the one hand it is more cost effective and better for quality of
care to have a strong base of PCP practices and on the other hand, there is a shortage of
PCPs making access difficult [10,76]. A reimbursement system must have both cost
effectiveness and PCP acceptability otherwise it will not improve cost and many fewer
physicians will become PCPs [10].
The cost of specialist referrals is a large contributing factor to overall health
costs and must be addressed in any strategy to lower costs. The decade from 1999 to
2009 saw rapid growth in referrals made to specialists by PCPs [11] prompting health
insurers in 2004 to respond to the increasing referral costs by managing the demands for
specialty referrals, using several tools including incentives and disincentives to PCPs,
limiting the number of contracted specialists, and placing gate keeping on patients but
these efforts have not succeeded in lowering referral rates [13].
Our other aim is to assess how reimbursement type is associated with chronic
disease management as reflected by the disease monitoring activities care provided to
patients with diabetes mellitus. A second major contributor to rising costs in healthcare is
chronic disease with the associated complications of which Diabetes Mellitus type 2
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(DM2) is one. DM2 is a serious health concern all over the world [19]. Improving
healthcare quality is of concern in all of the world regardless of the resources a country
may have [86,87]. In the U.S., nearly 10% of the population, approximately 23 million
people have been diagnosed with DM2 and it is estimated that there are another 7 million
who are undiagnosed [7]. It is the seventh leading cause of death in the U.S. [7]. The key
to the best care for chronic conditions like diabetes is a strong base of primary care with a
team approach [8, 9]. Diabetes is a chronic condition that impacts the overall health of
patients, for example, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), diabetics are 2-3 times more likely to die from a heart attack than those without
diabetes [14]. There are many factors that might be present with diabetes that can
influence overall health and complications. These include elevated low-density
lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol, elevated blood pressure (BP), smoking, and obesity [8, 9,
14, 15]. Diabetes is also implicated in kidney disease, eye diseases such as glaucoma or
cataracts, and neuropathy. Adequate control of diabetes can, therefore, prevent or
improve many other conditions. It is generally agreed by many systematic reviews that
quality management of diabetes will improve the quality of life, longevity, and overall
health of diabetics and that management requires recommended monitoring of the factors
that impact chronic conditions [16-18].
1.2 Statement of the Problem:
The healthcare system in the US is 16% of GDP making it the most expensive in
the world in spite of which, the health status of citizens does not reflect these higher costs
and is average or below average compared to other countries with less expensive health
systems [19]. To control healthcare costs, there has been an effort to begin to shift away

4

from FFS as the main reimbursement method to methods that are more value-based. As
the U.S. healthcare system continues to change there is a need to find a way both to
control costs and improve the quality of care. The principles of economic theory maintain
that humans act rationally, and PCPs should also act rationally. If PCPs act rationally,
they will seek to optimize their own well-being. So far, the attempts to incentivize
physicians to reduce costs, based on an assumption of rational behavior have had mixed
results [20]. While motivation may be complex, reward must still outweigh cost for
rational people, thus one of the motivating factors for physicians is income and physician
behavior will be influenced by payment method [4]. For example, if a DM2 patient must
see the doctor every 90 days or has a complication due to diabetes, this places additional
cost in terms of time and staffing on the physician, under CAP, the physician must absorb
this cost, however, under FFS, the physician will be paid for each visit and each service
related to the complication[20]. A logical conclusion is, for either case, if the payment is
not sufficient to cover the time and overhead costs, physicians may seek to avoid such
patients. In this dissertation, we focus on two of the largest and costliest health problems
which are Diabetes mellitus and referrals to specialists and study the behavior of PCPs in
dealing with them in relation to the payment systems.
Aim (1):
Our first aim is to show if there is a relationship between the behavior of PCPs
and two payment methods: CAP and FFS, on DM2 management. We compared PCPs
whose revenue source is derived from a practice with patients covered mainly under CAP
or FFS on the implementation of the ADA recommendations during PCP outpatient
visits.
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Aim (2):
Our second aim is to show if there is a relationship between the behavior of PCPs
and two payment methods: CAP and FFS in referral of patients to specialists. We
compared PCPs whose revenue source is derived from a practice with patients covered
mainly under CAP or FFS on rates of visits that result in specialist referral.
1.3 Rationale of the Study:
Because there is still not enough evidence to determine the best reimbursement
method, our study utilizes the data to demonstrate whether there is a relationship of
payment methods to physician behavior. We seek to find the best way to control the
upward spiraling of healthcare costs while maintaining high quality of care. According to
the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA). report, the NCQA and ADA
guidelines is to test HbA1C every 3-6 months, but 90% of diabetics only had it tested
once in 12 months. The report notes that only 39.8% show good diabetes control on this
indicator which is <7% [21]. The statistics on the number of diabetics who receive the
ADA recommended monitoring is less than 40% [21] which not only impacts the health,
quality of life, and longevity of patients but is also more costly in the long term [16, 36].
By using the ADA recommendations to measure the relationship of reimbursement to
how PCPs manage DM2 care this study provides a concrete metric to solve the two
problems of quality of care and cost.
By 2007 more than 50% of outpatient visits per year were to specialists in spite of
the frustration that both PCPs and specialists have with the referral process [12]. In spite
of payers’ efforts to curb the increasing rate of referrals, more than one third of patients
per year are referred to specialists [12]. Since efforts so far have failed to halt the increase
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in specialty referral, study of the effects of payment methods on referral decisions is
needed to determine if one method might yield a more optimal ratio of specialist
referrals.
This study expects to practically address these problems in health care: quality of
chronic disease care and referral to specialists. We seek to provide information that will
help policy makers to make decisions about the use of payment method to improve
quality and constrain cost.
1.4 Gap in the Literature:
For Aim1: While we have searched thoroughly for studies that have done this
exact type of assessment, we have not been able to find any. The study of diabetes
management has been addressed by several authors [6, 7, 9, 15, 17, 21-23]. Others have
studied physician behavior response to payment methods and incentives in Canada, UK,
Australia, and other countries as well as the U.S. with mixed results [6, 8, 10, 24, 25]. To
our knowledge, there have not been any studies that examined the relationship between
the use of best practices by PCPs for monitoring diabetics and whether the practice is
reimbursed predominantly by CAP vs. FFS (here, defined as 76% or more of patients
covered under CAP vs 76% of patients covered under FFS) in the USA. Ettner, et al
(2003) studied the processes of care for diabetes management and patient satisfaction
under salaried, FFS, and CAP reimbursement methods and found a correlation between
salaried payment method to process of care and positive patient satisfaction. However,
Ettner did not compare the use rates by PCPs based on how closely they followed the
ADA recommendations [6]. Recent Canadian studies examined the results of an incentive
code that would give PCPs higher reimbursement as well as monitoring screening based
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on type of practice, but the results are inconclusive and are not applicable to the U.S. case
[9, 17] since their reimbursement methods differ from the U.S. Some studies have looked
at the relationship of insurance type and out of pocket expenses to utilization and patient
satisfaction as a means to measure quality of care [22]. The findings of the TRIAD Study
Group did show that patients with higher out of pocket costs utilized fewer services and
also did less self-monitoring of glucose and were less compliant with medication than
patients with full coverage, but they did not compare high percentage of CAP coverage
vs high percentage FFS coverage and physicians adherence to the ADA
recommendations. There are studies showing the benefits of team-based practices over
independent practices from Canada, but they did not examine the reimbursement method
[8]. There are no studies that have assessed the quality of diabetic management by
measuring the utilization of The American Diabetes Association recommended
monitoring of HBA1C, retinal exams, foot exams, lipid testing, glucose levels, weight
management, patient education, urinalysis, and blood pressure in association with
payment methods. We study the PCP’s compliance with the ADA recommendations at
the DM2 patient visit to see if there is any difference between PCPs with patients mainly
covered by CAP vs FFS.
For Aim 2: Several international studies have examined referral practices, some in
relation to payment method, but they are not generalizable to the U.S. due to the
magnitude of the differences between our systems [1, 12, 26-29]. Studies of the U.S.
system have focused on several areas including comparisons of physician behavior in
response to payment method, specialty, managed care regimes, or patient characteristics
[19, 20, 30-33], To our knowledge there are no studies examining referral rates in relation
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to visits paid by CAP or FFS in the U.S. Our study seeks to fill this gap in the literature
by using the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) data to assess
physician referral decision making behavior in response to fee for FFS or CAP payment
methods in primary care patients in outpatient care settings in the U.S.
1.5 Innovation:
Our long-term goal is to fill the gap in the literature by using robust methods to
assess the association of FFS and CAP payments with PCP behavior. Ours is the first
paper to connect these two theories to this topic: 1-Agency Theory under Economic
Theory 2-Donabedian’s Model under Quality Theory. In this study, our immediate goal
was to address the question of whether CAP & FFS payment models are associated with
practice behavioral variations in regard to ADA guideline compliance for DM2 & referral
rates, and if payments relate to the motivation of physicians to provide services based on
evidence-based medicine. Details of our innovation in applying these theories can be
found in the conceptual framework in chapter 3.
1.6 Research Question and Hypotheses:
This study will answer the following research questions:
1-What is the association between primary care physician payment method and
the implementation of ADA recommended monitoring for DM2 outpatient visits?
2-What is the association between primary care physician payment method and
rates of referrals to specialists for outpatient visits?
H1: We hypothesized that PCPs primarily under CAP would show lower ADA
implementation rates than PCPs primarily under FFS payment methods.
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H2: We hypothesized that PCPs mainly under CAP would show higher specialist
referral rates than PCPs mainly under FFS payment methods.
1.7 Policy Implication:
This research has several policy implications. Since the PCP is the first contact
with the healthcare system for most patients, PCP behavior is the starting point to
optimize both quality and cost of healthcare. This study will inform healthcare policy
makers of the relationship between PCP behavior and reimbursement method, CAP &
FFS. A high level of diabetes management by PCPs will bring lower costs in the long run
by decreasing complications. Encouraging PCPs to use best practices in the referral to
specialist’s decision making will enhance both the quality of care and value per cost.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 OVERVIEW:
The goal of this study is to understand how financial incentives are associated
with the behavior of primary care physicians (PCPs) in the provision of care where
financial incentive is reflected by reimbursement type: capitation versus fee-for-service.
Our first aim examines the behavior of PCPs regarding following of ADA guidelines for
monitoring or the other payment method predominates among the physician’s patients.
Our second aim is to study physician behavior regarding decisions to refer patients to
specialists as it may be associated with whether CAP or FFS payment methods
predominate among the physician’s patients. Because DM2 and specialist referrals have
major impacts on the quality of healthcare and represent two of the most costly factors in
healthcare it is worthwhile to discover whether there is a relationship between payment
method and physician behavior in regards to these factors.
Economists assume that payment systems influence the behavior of physicians
[1,2] and economic theory is used to seek a way to shift physician reimbursement from
FFS toward a more value-based system rather than volume to maximize quality of care at
the lowest cost [3-5]. Examples from Lockner & Walcker’s study indicate that those
major insurance companies that have made the shift to value-based reimbursement show
reduced costs and greatly increased quality indicators [91]. There are several alternative
payment methods to fee-for-service including CAP, salaried, or blended; our study
focuses on CAP as the alternative payment method. Primary care is the foundation of the

11

healthcare system and, therefore, it is the logical point to begin to improve the quality of
care as well as to implement cost control [7-9]. Diabetes is a common chronic disease
that is causal in many other conditions, therefore its treatment could have a big impact on
healthcare quality and costs, so it makes sense to tackle the strategy to both improve
diabetes outcomes and reduce its longer-term healthcare costs [21]. We measure the
monitoring of DM2 according to ADA guidelines to see whether PCPs with either mainly
CAP patients or FFS patients are incentivized to apply those recommendations.
Along with chronic conditions such as diabetes, referrals are responsible for much
of the increasing cost of healthcare and also have a direct bearing on the quality of care,
therefore, it is another important area to study when seeking strategies to control costs
and improve quality [11]. The cost of specialist referrals is a large contributing factor to
overall health costs and thus must be addressed in any strategy to lower costs. The decade
from 1999 to 2009 saw rapid growth in referrals made to specialists by PCPs, creating
concern over future spending [11]. In 2007 more than 50% of outpatient visits per year
were to specialists in spite of the frustration that both PCPs and specialists have with the
referral process [12]. Health insurers in 2004 responded to the increasing referral costs
by managing the demands for specialty referrals, using several tools including incentives
and disincentives to PCPs, limiting the number of contracted specialists, and placing gate
keeping on patients [13]. Since those efforts so far have failed to halt the increase in
specialty referral, a study of the effects of payment methods on referral decision making
is needed to determine the best way to optimize the ratio of specialist referrals.
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2.1 Evidence about Reimbursement type on PCPs behavior in regard to health care
system:
Evidence connects physician reimbursement type with both quality and quantity
of healthcare services. While there are many studies of payment methods related to
utilization as a metric, what is missing in the literature is the effect of payment methods
on the quality of DM2 management. It has been suggested that since PCPs under CAP
and salary are paid in advance and regardless of the services provided, they may not
worry about improving the quality of their care. At the same time, it is implied that PCPs
under FFS will have an incentive to improve the quality of healthcare for their patients to
keep their patients satisfied with their services. The existing literature tends to support the
idea that reimbursement type does influence physician behavior but not necessarily in
predictable ways. For example, Glied and Zivin (2002) found that the length of visit,
which is a marker for quality of care, was the same across patients regardless of whether
they were CAP or FFS or some other plan, however, fewer prescriptions were ordered for
patients who were under CAP [42]. On the other hand, Landon, et. al. (2011), found
reduced visit lengths for CAP patients. Nevertheless, Glied and Zivin as well as Landon,
et. al. conclude that payment structure affects physician behavior [42,43].
Studies based in the United States:
Several studies have found a direct relationship between payment method and
physician behavior. Hellinger in a 1996 review of evidence showed that reimbursement
does have an impact on physician behavior and that FFS incentivizes overutilization
while CAP incentivizes underutilization [45]. A large 2013 U.S. study by Pearson, et. al.,
of nearly 10,000 patient visits revealed that PCPs under CAP were more likely to provide
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patient education, which the authors claim is important for quality care especially for
patients with chronic conditions [71]. Another American study by Chang, et. al. (2013)
examined sociological factors in the care of asthmatic children and whether the treatment
to control the illness vs merely to use reliever treatments could be related to a number of
variables including payment method. The highest standard of care was found among
pediatricians’ CAP patients, privately insured patients and white patients. There were
many variables in this study, but the authors found differences based on whether patients
were publicly or privately insured and whether they were CAP or FFS [31]. This
corroborates our study of PCP behavior in response to payment method. Other studies of
physician behavior and quality such as Stoddard, et.al. (2003) have shown inconsistency
in access and the provision of preventive services for patients under CAP [25]. The
results of an interesting natural experiment in 1988 were analyzed by Ogden, et. al.
(1990), in which an Independent Physicians Association (IPA) decided to change
payment methods from FFS to CAP. The study showed that after converting to CAP,
costs for specialists increased only 2% in the year of the change compared to annual
increases of 12% in previous years. While hospitalizations were unchanged, hospital
outpatient services decreased 7% compared to annual increases of 12% in previous years
[40].
International Studies:
Several international studies have been conducted to examine the effect of various
factors including payment method on physician behavior and practice characteristics, but
none of these examined referral rates or DM2 management and none are necessarily
generalizable to the U.S. However, they are valuable studies which indicate how the
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payment system can impact behavior of physicians in regard to health services quality
and provision. A Canadian study by Glazier, et.al (2009) comparing practice
characteristics found that there were significant differences between traditional CAP and
enhanced FFS in which CAP showed increased ED visits and decreased after-hours
access compared to enhanced FFS [69]. Another Canadian study by Green (2014)
conducted as a simulation on intrinsic and extrinsic motivators showed that while
physicians are intrinsically motivated to treat patients with the highest quality of care,
when income is insecure, as in FFS, extrinsic motivators override intrinsic motivators
leading them to conclude that to encourage the best quality of care, CAP and salary are
better than FFS [70]. Since the above study was a laboratory simulation it has value only
as a starting point for further research. A study by Sun, et. al. (2016) conducted in China
using national data, assessed the changes in access to outpatient primary care and its
relationship to cost reduction. Sun’s study showed that moving to a CAP system of
physician reimbursement resulted in lower inpatient hospitalization rates, and decreasing
costs, while outpatient visits increased indicating increased access to primary care which
presumably improves quality of care [28].
To measure PCP behavioral change in response to payment method, Gosden, et.
al. (2001) conducted a systematic review of studies in the UK of PCPs under four
payment regimes: FFS, CAP, salaried, and targeted payments. The authors conclude that
before payment regimes are put into place more extensive careful studies need to be
conducted because the changes that have been made to date are not based on
scientifically rigorous research findings [1]. For our study, this is a useful study to draw
on because they did find specific behavioral differences, for example patients under FFS
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had more patient visits and more continuity of care than those under CAP and also the
volume of services was higher among the FFS patients than CAP. However patient
satisfaction over access to their PCP was lower among FFS patients and highest among
patients seeing salaried doctors. Hospitalizations were higher in the patients under FFS
than under CAP, but actual healthcare costs were higher among those under CAP than
FFS [1]. They were unable to generalize findings other than to say that more rigorous
research is needed. This study cannot be generalized to the U.S. since the systems are so
different.
Payment methods as motivation:
To understand the motivations driving physician behavior to provide high quality
of care, some studies have looked at variables including payment method. According to a
2013 data review of Medicare & Medicaid by Gerhardt, et.al., the prevailing payment
method of FFS not only encourages overutilization, but it also has not incentivized
physicians to take responsibility for outcomes [46]. To incentivize physician behavior to
pay closer attention to healthcare outcomes rather than just services provided, payers
have tried contracts that hold providers responsible for failed outcomes. McCluskey
quotes Blue Cross’ claim that these contracts have reduced costs and improved quality of
care, including better coordination of care. This report demonstrates the strategies being
employed by payers to control costs [49]. Gosden, et. al. (2001) found in their systematic
review that CAP incentivizes PCPs to make sure that costs do not exceed the amount
received per capita. There are a few strategies that may be employed to ensure that costs
do not exceed reimbursement. One such strategy is to be selective about which patients to
accept. By accepting the healthiest patients, PCPs reduce the amount of time they have to
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spend with the patient as well as the cost of any treatment and if the payments are
bundled, saves on the cost of specialists as well [1]. Kiran, et. al. (2015) examined
practices that transitioned to CAP with a team-based approach and the impacts on cancer
screening and found cervical cancer screening improved relative to enhanced FFS while
screenings for colorectal cancer and breast cancer showed no significant difference
between the two payment methods [8]. In a study of referral strategies, Mehrotra, et. al.
(2011) noted the trend to bundling of payments and in their opinion cautioned that
underutilization could result from the bundling of payments under CAP when PCPs are
incentivized to treat patients themselves instead of referring them to specialists [12].
Forrest, et. al. (2006) noted that health insurers, starting in 2004, responded to the
increasing referral costs by managing the demands for specialty referrals, using several
tools including incentives and disincentives to PCPs such as bundled payments in which
the amount going to the PCP was reduced to pay for the specialist, limiting the number of
contracted specialists, and placing gate keeping on patients [13]. While insurers are
seeking to transition away from FFS to less costly reimbursement methods, Gold, et. al.
(1995), caution that reimbursement effects on PCP behavior is a complex subject to
research due to the many confounding variables within medical practice such as group
culture, practice structure, patient factors, and organizational context [44].
2.2 Evidence for the association between Reimbursement type and diabetes quality
of care (Aim 1):
The literature shows a moderate relationship between payment method and
monitoring of DM2 patients. A 2014 Canadian study revealed a gap between patients
enrolled in blended CAP programs vs blended FFS in which those enrolled in blended
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CAP programs had higher quality of care and monitoring than those under FFS, while
those not enrolled in any plan showed the lowest quality of care [9]. In a 2003 study to
assess patient satisfaction, a measure of quality, Escarce, et. al, found that diabetic
patients with glaucoma or diabetic retinopathy had a higher level of satisfaction with
specialists treating their condition than with PCPs and the lowest level of satisfaction was
with physicians who received their payments from bonuses or CAP [37]. Kiran, et. al,
conducted a second study in 2015 examining both payment method and team-based
practice impacts on DM2 monitoring and cancer screening and found that improved
monitoring of diabetics occurred under a capitation model and the best outcome was
under capitation with a collaborative team approach [8]. Their conclusion was that the
best outcomes for DM2 and other chronic conditions would be reached with a transition
to CAP reimbursement. Conversely, a previous 2010 study by Pawaskar, et. al., of
Medicaid recipients with DM2 was in contradiction with the findings of Kiran [53]. The
findings of this research were that Medicaid recipients with DM2 who were on managed
care plans that were CAP, experienced decreased preventive care and monitoring,
increased hospitalizations, increased ED visits, and decreased outpatient visits. The
conclusion of this study is to question the wisdom of enacting short-term cost cutting
systems that lead to long term increases in costs. The Diabetes Management Incentive
(DMI) is a pay for performance (P4P) mechanism in Ontario as a means to encourage
better monitoring of DM2. At least one study in 2013 by Kantarevic and Kralj, found that
it worked better for physicians on blended CAP plans than on enhanced FFS payment
arrangements [53]. P4P is a system of incentives tied to primary reimbursement methods;
the authors concluded that this showed a successful response from physicians under
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blended CAP but not under FFS and that further research is needed. In an effort to get at
the gaps in the monitoring and management for DM2 care researchers Dall, et. al.,
(2016), analyzed insured adults with diabetes comparing insurance type and several other
variables [54]. Their results highlighted the number of insured with undiagnosed DM2,
the low rates of eye exams among the insured, and the low levels of hypertension and
hyperlipidemia control. Using claims data, Dall, et.al. analyzed the amount of monitoring
and revealed that there are about 43% of diagnosed DM2 patients with uncontrolled or
poorly controlled diabetes [54].
2.3 Evidence for Reimbursement type on Referral to specialists (Aim 2):
Studies based in the United States:
The cost of specialist referrals is a large contributing factor to overall health costs
and thus must be addressed in any strategy to lower costs. Barnett, et.al., reported in
2012, that the decade from 1999 to 2009 saw rapid growth in referrals made to specialists
by PCPs creating concern over future spending [11]. The decision to refer a patient has an
impact on both the quality and cost of the patient’s healthcare and as policy makers
wrestle with cost control in the future, they are likely to restrict the rate of referral,
justification for referral, and specific network providers [30, 64]. Forrest, et. al. (2003)
conducted a study of referral rates for patient visits comparing those that are under
gatekeeping plans and no gatekeeping plans. Those with gatekeeping plans showed
increased rates of referrals compared to the no gate keeping plans regardless of whether
they were CAP or not [73]. This is a different emphasis than our study which does not
include gatekeeping as a variable. Using NAMCS data on office visits, Forrest, et. al.
(2006) found that patient characteristics seemed to be the most important factor in
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referral decisions, however, they did note that uninsured and Medicare patients were less
likely to be referred at any given visit [13]. In addition, Shea, et.al. (1999) found that
Medicare patients have double the referral rate per year; the reason they are less likely to
be referred at a particular visit is attributable to the fact that Medicare recipients make
more frequent use of primary care meaning that if they have for example four or five
visits per year, they will not be referred at many of those visits [55]. A study by Zuvekas
Nd Hill (2004) on access under CAP, showed a difference in physician behavior
depending on the contract and the HMO model in which contracts requiring physicians to
pay specialists when they refer under CAP had fewer referrals, but that response
depended on HMO type such as “group/staff” more than on CAP to the individual
provider. [25]. Zuvekas referenced Iversen and Luras (2000) and Stems, Wolfe, and
Kindig (1992) in pointing out that the behavior of physicians may be affected differently
depending on how the contract is written. For example, a PCP will treat patients
themselves more rather than refer out if they are required to pay the specialist or may
increase their available hours for access if they are required to pay for emergency
department visits [25].
International studies:
Several international studies have examined referral rates and physician behavior
but though they are not generalizable to the U.S., they are worth considering. A Canadian
study by Liddy, C., et al in 2014 found that there were large differences between FFS and
CAP that were significant with more than 33% fewer referrals made under FFS than CAP
[26]. However, the authors were unable to conclude whether this lower rate is justified in
terms of healthcare quality [26]. A new Canadian study by Sisera, et. al. (2018) examined
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referral rates over an eight-year period from 2005-2013 and found a 5-8% annual
increase in referrals among PCPs who changed to blended CAP over the PCPs who did
not change from blended FFS. This increase represents an overall cost to the healthcare
system of 7-9% higher in blended CAP relative to the blended FFS. The authors noted
that in the beginning of the switch to blended CAP the referrals decreased but over the
longer-term they found referrals increased. The study did not advance a theory for the
increases but noted that the referrals should be assessed to determine whether indeed they
were necessary before any policy decisions can be made based on this finding [90]. A
1990 study by Krasnik, et.al. of specialist referral rates in Denmark showed a similar
response to a change in payment method. In this case the physicians went from being
paid solely under CAP to a blended CAP/FFS system. As might be expected, referral
rates declined while services provided by PCPs increased, leading the authors to conclude
that the PCPs were sensitive to remuneration [41]. A Norwegian study by Iversen and
Lurås (2000) examined referral rates over a 3-year period, 1993-1996 after FFS was
replaced with CAP in mid 1993. As predicted, referral rates went up to specialists. Their
analysis showed a clear relationship between payment regime and behavior of PCPs. This
is an intriguing study that does parallel our own, however, this was a comparison of
before and after, 100% FFS to 100% CAP [27]. We only observe cross-sectional
associations in our study.
2.4 Gap (Summary):
Reimbursement and Quality of Diabetes Management (Aim 1):
Based on our literature search there are no studies that have assessed the quality
of diabetic management by measuring the utilization of The American Diabetes
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Association recommended monitoring in association with payment methods. The study of
diabetes management has been addressed by several authors but not in a focused way of
comparing payment method and the implementation of ADA guidelines [6,7,9,15,17,2123]. We have found some international studies in Canada, UK, Australia, and other
countries that have studied physician behavior in DM2 management response to payment
methods and incentives with mixed results, but they are not applicable to the U.S. [6, 8,
10, 24, 25]. We also found a few studies that provide guidance regarding possible
confounding non-financial factors that affect the quality of DM2 management, such as
whether patients are insured, where they live (urban v rural), socioeconomic conditions,
out of pocket expense, team v solo practice, and patient satisfaction, and others [8,22].
Thus, to our knowledge, those studies that examined payment methods in relation to
quality of DM2 care, some of which are international are not applicable to the U.S.
[8,9,53] and some of which are American studies, have not used ADA recommendations
as their metric to determine quality [37, 54]. Our study seeks to fill this gap by using the
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) data to assess physician behavior
in applying ADA recommendations among DM2 patients in response to FFS or CAP
payment methods in primary care patients in outpatient care settings in the U.S.
Reimbursement and Referral to Specialists (Aim 2):
Numerous international studies have examined referral practices, some in relation
to payment method, but they are not generalizable to the U.S. due to the magnitude of the
differences between our systems [1, 12, 26-29]. Studies of the U.S. system have focused
on several areas including comparisons of physician behavior in response to payment
method, specialty, managed care regimes, or patient characteristics [19, 20, 30-33],
22

without comparison between the payment method and referral rate. However, few studies
exist which examined the relationship of physician payment methods with FFS vs CAP
on referral rates by primary care physicians in the U.S. Our study seeks to fill this gap in
the literature by using the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) data to
assess physician referral rates and their association with FFS vs. CAP payment methods
in primary care patients in outpatient care settings in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 conceptual framework:
We apply this framework to our questions through evaluation of which health care
services are provided for DM2 patients for first aim and at what rate primary care patient
visits result in specialist referral, by measuring whether the staff provides services based
on evidence-based medicine. Specifically, for Aim 1 we analyze the data to see whether
there is a difference in the use of ADA recommended initial visit monitoring parameters
between PCPs who obtain most of their revenue from patients covered under CAP and
PCPs who derive most of their revenue from patients covered under FFS. Specifically for
Aim 2 we analyze the data to see whether there is a difference in the decision to refer to
specialists as evidenced by referral rates between PCPs who obtain most of their revenue
from patients covered under CAP and PCPs who derive most of their revenue from
patients covered under FFS.
3.1.1 Outcome:
The outcome for AIM 1 is the comparative frequency of the use of the ADA
recommendations in the visits of patients with DM2 between PCPs with more than 75%
of capitated patients and PCPs with more than 75% of FFS patients. Coyle’s and Battles
modified Donabedian’s SPO Model suggests incorporating pertinent antecedents of
medical care into the conceptual framework for outcome assessment. Our model
simulates the idea from the Coyle’s and Battles’ modified Donabedian’s SPO Model but
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on the physician level instead of patient level. Antecedents included in our study are
specifically the patient characteristics of age, sex, race, and insurance plan payment type
which will have an impact on SPO at the organization level [75].
Coyle and Battles’ modified SPO model guides the aim of this research by modeling how
all three elements of this model interact and how physician characteristics and patient
characteristics based on outpatient visits may influence these three elements. In addition,
we use Agency theory with Donabedian’s Model by testing the relationship between
payment methods and quality. Agency theory gives us the Principal/Agent relationship
between payers and PCPs, while Donabedian’s provides a quality model by using
Structure, Process, and Outcome. One of our innovations in this study is to connect the
two theories together since other studies have examined each theory separately.
According to Agency Theory, behavior and motivation are affected by financial
incentives [76]. There is a knowledge gap between the payers and the providers that
allows for suppliers to provide services in a different way. Under this theory, physicians
are the agents and payers are the principals. The principals desire an outcome that
minimizes costs created by the agents with the guarantee that providers provide highquality care [76]. The application of agency theory here is to compare the method of
reimbursement to PCPs in relation to utilization of healthcare services by assessing the
rate of providing diabetic quality matrix by PCPs paid primarily through CAP vs. PCPs
paid primarily through FFS. For example, under CAP the plan pays a fixed amount to the
physician per patient who is a plan member on a periodic basis such as monthly to
provide all healthcare services to that patient. Physicians are paid irrespective of the cost
incurred to treat the patient meaning that the cost for some patients will be lower than the
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monthly amount paid to the doctor and some will be higher. Essentially, this fixed
payment amount per patient spreads the risk such that it is shared by the insurer and the
physician unlike FFS plans in which providers are paid for each service provided to the
patient, meaning there is no sharing of the financial risk [77]. If the financial risk is too
high for physicians, as in contract compatible incentives, agency theory suggests that
physicians may not be good agents for patients. Thus, payment methods may impact the
quality of care for patients, particularly patients with multiple chronic conditions as many
diabetics have. (see figure 1).
Outcome for Aim 2 is the comparative frequency of primary health care patient
visits resulting in referral to specialists under CAP vs FFS. Outcome is also the effect on
utilization of specialist services between visits covered under CAP vs FFS [78]. Coyle’s
and Battles’ modified Donabedian’s SPO Model suggests incorporating pertinent
antecedents of medical care into the conceptual framework for outcome assessment.
Antecedents may include patient characteristics, such as genetics, socio-demographic
factors, health beliefs and attitudes, and preferences that may affect structure, process,
and outcome [75]. We apply the same theoretical principles using Agency theory and a
Donabedian model as in Aim 1 to analyze PCP behavior (Fig 1).
3.2 Policy Implications:
This research has several policy implications. The PCP is the first contact with the
healthcare system for most patients. Therefore, determining PCP behavior is the starting
point to maximize both quality healthcare and value per cost. This study informs
healthcare policy makers of the relationship between PCP behavior and reimbursement
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework – Quality Donabedian Model- Agency Theory
method, CAP & FFS. A high level of diabetes management by PCPs will bring lower
costs in the long run by decreasing complications. Encouraging PCPs to use best
practices in the referral to specialist’s decision making will enhance both the quality of
care and value per cost.
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3.3 Research Questions:
3.3.1 Research Question (1):
What is the association between primary care physician payment method and the
implementation of ADA recommended monitoring for DM2 outpatient visits?
3.3.2 Research Question (2):
What is the association between primary care physician payment method and
rates of referrals to specialists for outpatient visits?
3.4 Hypotheses:
H1: We hypothesized that PCPs whose patient mix is more than 75% covered by
CAP plans will implement the ADA recommendations with their DM2 patients at a lower
rate than PCPs whose patient mix is more than 75% covered by FFS.
H2: We hypothesized that PCPs mainly under CAP will show higher specialist
referral rates than PCPs mainly under FFS payment methods
3.5 Methodology:
For Aim 1:
Aim 1 is to identify the association of the behavior of PCPs in managing type 2
diabetes with two payment methods, CAP and FFS. Specifically, on the implementation
of the ADA recommendations for evidenced based medical care of diabetics on their first
visit.
3.5.1 Study Design:
This study uses a cross-sectional design of DM2 patient visits to PCPs. This study
design is selected because it assesses the association between different payment methods
and the provision of high-quality services at a given point in time.
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3.5.2 Participants:
The participants in this project are comprised of PCPs and outpatient visits by
patients with Type 2 diabetes mellitus as represented in the NAMCS data sets for 2014
and 2015.
3.5.3 Setting:
Nationwide (Representative data for USA outpatient settings)
3.5.4 Data Sources :(NAMCS data):
Our data are from the 2014 and 2015 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
(NAMCS), a national survey of office visits to private physicians throughout the U.S.
This survey is conducted annually by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) using multi-level sampling
at both the physician and patient level. It is a component of the National Health Care
Surveys, which measure utilization of health care services across a diversity of
healthcare. The survey produces weighted national estimates of office visits using a
multistage probability design with three stages of sampling; geographic, physician
practice, and patient visits. The first stage samples geographic areas as the primary
sampling units (PSUs), the second stage samples physicians in each PSU, and the third
stage randomly samples patient visits to physicians’ offices. The survey includes
physicians of many specialties who may see ambulatory patients except anesthesia,
radiology, and pathology and the survey information was collected for one week in
physicians’ offices by either a physician or staff member. The survey itself contains
information on physician specialty, patient demographics, visit reasons, payment
methods, and other information. For our study we use visits to PCPs by patients with
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DM2 for Aim 1 during the survey week [79]. We combine all of the ADA recommended
monitoring testing into one quality index. we pool the data for two years to increase
sample size to increase the power of the statistical test since a larger sample size narrows
the variance of the distribution of the test statistic [80]. There are many studies using
pooled NAMCS data in cross sectional studies [81-84].
3.5.5 Dependent or Outcome Variable for Aim1:
Diabetic Quality matrix is a continuous variable representing the number of
monitoring parameters that a physician provided to DM2 patients. The index is
comprised of 3 divisions 1- Laboratory evaluations, 2-Physical Examination, and 3screening services. See table 3.1. In addition, Table 3.5 shows that 95% of the Quality
Matrix Indicators are distributed within the range of 3-8 performed at office visits with
the highest distribution of 38% occurring at the level of 3 QM indicators and in
descending order thereafter. Moreover, Table 3.6 shows the frequency of each Individual
Diabetic Quality Matrix indicator. Mixed payments has a higher percentage than the
other payment types in 5 of the 15 indicators as does FFS, and CAP had a higher
percentage in 3 indicators. Payment types were similar on 2 indicators.
3.5.6 Independent variable:
The independent variable of interest in this study is reimbursement method for
PCPs which is a categorical variable since ( 0= physicians with more than 75% of
patients covered by FFS, 2= physician with 26% to 75% of patients covered by either
CAP or FFS (Mixed), 1= physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by CAP).
The NAMCS data report the source of revenue of physicians by percentages, for example
if CAP or FFS is 25% or less, 26-50%, 51-75%, or more than 75%. To distinguish
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between the association of the two reimbursement methods we need a significant
difference in the percentage of revenue from each source. We selected the above 75%
level of reimbursement method, either CAP or FFS to enhance the chances that a visit
will be most likely to be reimbursed by one of those types so that a valid assessment of
the hypothesis can be made. see Table 3.1 & 3.2.
3.5.7 Control Variables:
Control Variables consist of variables that adjust the probability of occurrence of
any of the outcome variables and include Physician characteristics, patients’
characteristics, and payer characteristics. (See Table 3.1 below)

Table 3.1 Dependent, Independent, and controller Variables for Aim 1
Variable
Diabetic Quality matrix
ADA-Recommendations

Survey item / Medical record review collection
Outcome variable (Q1)
Were these services done?
A-Laboratory Tests:
1- HbA1c (Glycohemoglobin): The HbA1c or
glycohemoglobin/glycosylated hemoglobin test measures the percentage of
hemoglobin that is bound with glucose molecules and is usually reported as
a percent.
2- Lipid Profile: Enter “A lipid profile includes any of the following tests:
cholesterol, LDL, HDL, cholesterol/HDL ratio, triglycerides, coronary risk
profile, and lipid profile.
3- Urinalysis: A urinalysis checks different components of urine to identify
potential problems. More than 100 different tests can be done on urine,
including specific gravity, color, clarity, odor, pH, protein, and glucose.
Include “clean catch” urine sample. Often abbreviated as U/A or urine dip.
4- Liver enzyme hepatic function panel
5- Renal function test: (Creatinine)
6-Thyroid test: Thyroid stimulating hormone
7- Metabolic panel: like sodium, potassium, and other.
B-Physical Examinations:
8-Foot: A foot exam includes visual inspection, sensory exam, and pulse
exam.
9- Retinal: A retinal exam includes any of the following: ophthalmoscopy,
fundoscopy, and dilated retinal exam (DRE).
An eye exam includes any of the following: ophthalmoscopy, fundoscopy,
slit lamp exam, visual field (VF) exam, and visual acuity exam (vision test).
10- Blood Pressure: Was blood pressure taken?
11- weight: Was weight measurement reported?
12- Height: height: Was height measurement reported?
C- Screening:
13- Family planning discussion
14- Depression screening
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measurement
Continuous,
ranging from 0 to
15

Patient age group

15- Diabetic education
Main of interest Independent variable (Q1)
Roughly, what percent of your patient care revenue comes from capitation?
1 = Less than or equal to 25 percent
2 = 26-50 percent
3 = 51-75 percent
4 = More than 75 percent
Roughly, what percent of your patient care revenue comes from usual,
customary, and reasonable fee-for-service?
1 = Less than or equal to 25 percent
2 = 26-50 percent
3 = 51-75 percent
4 = More than 75 percent
Controllers (Q1)
Patients characteristics
Patient Age (reported in years or derived from date of visit and date of birth)

Patient sex

Patient sex

Patient race

Patient race and ethnicity

Total chronic

Total number of chronic conditions?

BMI

Body mass index

Hyperlipidemia

Does patient now have hyperlipidemia

Hypertension

Does patient now have hyperlipidemia

New Patient

was a patient new for this visit?

Payments types

Expected Sources of Payment for this Visit

Physicians
reimbursement methods

Providers characteristics
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Categorical:
0 = More than
75% from
FFs
1 =More than
75% from
Capitation
2 =Mixed FFS
and CAP

Categorical
0= Adult<40
1=Adult 40-60
2= Adult>60
Binary (0, 1).
0 = Male
1 = Female
Categorical
0=White
1=Black
2=Other
Categorical
0= 1-3 chronic
diseases
1=>3 chronic
diseases
Categorical
0= Underweight
1= Normal
weight
2=Overweight
3= Obese
Binary
(0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Binary
(0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Binary
(0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Categorical
0=Private
1=Public
(Medicare &
Medicaid)
2= Worker’s
Compensation
3= Other (Selfpay & No
charge/charity)
4=Uninsured

Ownership status

Are you a full or part owner, employee, or independent contractor at this
visit location?

Solo group

Do you have a solo practice, or are you associated with other physicians in a
partnership, a group practice or some other way at this visit location?

Metropolitan status

Urban vs Rural

Geographic regions

Consider-quality
measurements on
compensation: Yes

(Based on location where majority of visit records were sampled)

payer characteristics
Consider specific measures of quality like preventive in compensation

Categorical
1 = Full owner
2 = Part owner
3 = Employee
4 = Contractor
Binary
(0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Binary
(0,1).
0 = Rural
1 = Urban
Categorical
1 = Northeast
2 = Midwest
3 = South
4 = West
Binary
(0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes

For Aim 2:
Our second aim is to show the association of the referral to specialist behavior of
PCPs with two payment methods: CAP and FFS. We compare PCPs whose revenue
source is derived from a practice with more than 75% of either patients covered under
CAP or FFS, on specialist referral rates.
3.5.8 Data source and Collection:
Same as Aim 1 except the patient visits are all visits regardless of reason
3.5.9 Study Design:
This is a cross-sectional study of the rate of referrals to specialists by PCPs
among primary care patients. This study design is selected because it assesses the
association between different payment methods and the utilization of health care services
at a point or period of time.
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3.5.10 Participants:
The participants in this project are comprised of PCPs and outpatients who were
visiting PCPs.
3.5.11 Setting:
Nationwide (Representative data for USA outpatient settings)
3.5.12 Dependent or Outcome Variable for Aim2:
The outcome (dependent) variable in this study is whether a patient visit resulted
in a referral to a specialist, it is a binary variable since 1= visit resulted in referral to a
specialist, while 0= visit did not result in referral to a specialist.
3.5.13 Independent variable:
Same as Aim 1
3.5.14 Control Variables:
Control Variables consist of variables that adjust the probability of occurrence of
any of the outcome variables and include Physician characteristics and patients’
characteristics. (See Table 3.2 below)
Table 3.2 Dependent, Independent, and controller Variables for Aim 2
Variable
Referral status

Physicians reimbursement
methods

Survey item / Medical record review collection
Outcome variable (Q2)
Patient was instructed to consult or seek care from
another physician/provider?
Main of interest Independent variable (Q2)
Roughly, what percent of your patient care
revenue comes from capitation?
1 = Less than or equal to 25 percent
2 = 26-50 percent
3 = 51-75 percent
4 = More than 75 percent
Roughly, what percent of your patient care
revenue comes from usual, customary, and
reasonable fee-for-service?
1 = Less than or equal to 25 percent
2 = 26-50 percent
3 = 51-75 percent
4 = More than 75 percent
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measurement
Binary (0,1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Categorical:
0 = More than 75%
from FFs
1 =More than 75%
from Capitation
2 =Mixed FFS and
CAP

Patient age

Controllers (Q2)
Patients characteristics
Patient Age (reported in years or derived from
date of visit and date of birth)

Patient sex

Patient sex

Patient race

Patient race and ethnicity

Payments types

Expected Sources of Payment for this Visit

New Patient

was a patient new for this visit?

Number of chronic
diseases

Total number of chronic diseases?

Ownership status

Providers characteristics
Are you a full or part owner, employee, or
independent contractor at this visit location?

Solo group

Do you have a solo practice, or are you associated
with other physicians in a partnership, a group
practice or some other way at this visit location?

Metropolitan status

Urban vs Rural

Geographic regions

(Based on location where majority of visit records
were sampled)

Consider-financialperformance on
compensation: Yes

payer characteristics
Consider Overall financial performance of the
practice in compensation
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Categorical
0= Adult<40
1=Adult 40-60
2= Adult>60

Binary (0, 1).
0 = Male
1 = Female
Categorical
0=White
1=Black
2=Other
Categorical
0=Private
1=Public (Medicare
& Medicaid)
2= Worker’s
Compensation
3= Other (Self-pay &
No charge/charity)
4=Uninsured
Binary (0,
1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Categorical
0=No chronic
diseases
1= 1-3 chronic
diseases
2=>3 chronic
diseases
Categorical
1 = Full owner
2 = Part owner
3 = Employee
4 = Contractor
Binary (0,
1).
0 = No
1 = Yes
Binary
(0,1).
0 = Rural
1 = Urban
Categorical
1 = Northeast
2 = Midwest
3 = South
4 = West
Binary (0,
1).
0 = No
1 = Yes

3.6 Primary Statistical Analysis for Aim 1 and Aim 2:
For both Aim 1 and Aim 2 we investigate the impact of reimbursement methods
(CAP vs FFS) on the behavior of PCPs on providing quality evidence-based healthcare
either for diabetic patients or for specialist referrals in the outpatient setting in the US.
Using multivariable linear regression for Aim1 and multivariable logistic regression for
Aim 2 on the survey (svy) data follows:
𝑌 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽& '()*+,-._+,.0123 + 𝛽5 𝑋7 + 𝛽8 𝑋9 + 𝛽: 𝑋; + 𝜀
For Aim 1
Regression equation for the first research question:
Linear regression of (𝑌 −?@ABCD@E'FADG@H )= β0 + β1*payment methods+ β2*Patage + β3* Pat-sex + β4* Pat-race + β5* Pat-BMI+ β6* Pat-Hyperlipidemia+ β7* PatHypertension+ β8*Pat-Total chronic+ β9*new-patient+ β10* Pat-health insurances+
β11* Doc-ownership + β12* Doc-Solo + β13* Doc-Metropolitan status + β14*Docgeographical area + β15* Pay-Quality compensation + ε.
For Aim 2:
Regression equation for the second research question:
Log odds of J𝑌 −KCLCGGAM'NDADON P= β0 + β1*payment methods+ β2*Pat-age + β3*
Pat-sex + β4* Pat-race + β5*Pat-Total chronic +β6*new-patient + β7* Pat-health
insurances + β8* Doc-ownership + β9* Doc-Solo + β10* Doc-geographical area + β11*
Doc-Metropolitan status + β12* Pay-Financial compensation + ε.
In this model, the outcome variable for Aim 1 is the number of monitoring
parameters that are provided to DM2 patients during the PCP visit, which is a continuous
variable based on ADA recommendations, while the outcome variable for Aim 2 is
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whether a patient visit resulted in a referral to a specialist. The main independent variable
of interest for both Aim 1 and Aim 2 is the reimbursement payment method that is
received by physicians, which is a categorical variable (0= physicians with more than
75% of patients covered by FFS, 1= physicians with more than 75% of patients covered
by CAP, 2= physicians with less than 75% of patients covered by either CAP or FFS).
Confounder variables include variables with subscripts P, D, and I which are defined at
the individual doctor, patient, and payer levels respectively. The vector of baseline
characteristics Xd which includes characteristics of the provider (with whom the patient
sought care) include variables such as age, sex, race, practice period (Debt=experience),
geographic area (Urban vs Rural), and ownership status and others. The patient level
covariates Xp, includes characteristics of the patient variables such as age, sex, race, comorbidities and medical conditions, geographic area (Urban vs Rural), insurance status,
and whether the patient is new and others. The individual doctor level covariates Xi
include characteristics of payer variables such as whether the payer considers quality
measurements in compensation to the provider and whether the payer considers overall
financial performance of the practice in compensation to the providers. These control
variables may affect the behavior of primary physicians in regard to providing
comprehensive health care services to their patients. (See Table1 & 2 above). Finally, ε is
an error term assumed to be independently and identically distributed. The primary
coefficient of interest is β1 for Aim1 which identifies the magnitude of CAP vs FFS
reimbursement on the outcome variable.
The unit of measure in our studies using NAMCS data is based on the patient care
encounter or visit. Using a 3-step process, we analyze the data as follows: 1. We give a
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description of the dataset of the number, frequencies, percentages, and standard error of
the sample of visits variables in the study. Missing data and variables will be removed as
well as other variables not related to the study. 2. We test each of the two dependent
variables separately against each of the other predictor variables through using bivariate
analysis or crosstabs procedure. 3. We use multivariable linear and logistic regression to
analyze the data. Our study employs Wald chi square to assess the logistic regression
procedure. Wald chi square tests investigate significance of each independent variable.
The model estimates allow estimation of odds ratios and confidence intervals for each
covariate. Our analysis satisfies both of our hypotheses and provides for discussion of the
expected results of the relationships and associations.
Given the nested structure of the data, we account for potentially correlated error
terms. Utilizing a design-based variance matrix based on the weighted data for patients'
visits level within physicians’ clusters during the regression yields variance matrix
estimators that ensure population-level inference that is robust to any within-providers
correlation structure. Alongside with using the multiple linear and logistic regression
model to study the relationship. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (Cis) are
obtained. We use Stata software, Version 14 for the data analysis. All tests are two-sided
and a p-value <0.05 is considered to be statistically significant.
3.7 Power and sample size analysis:
NAMCS was selected as the preferred dataset. The study combined 2014, and
2015 datasets for study to generate increased sample size. The robustness of the NAMCS
datasets provided sufficient power for statistical analysis. Each year supplied a minimum
of 4,532 primary care patient visits for analysis creating 29,434 total patient encounters
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for analysis which is equal to 709,279,534 after weighting for 3 years. Of these total
primary care visits total DM2 visits were 1,254 (47,374,354 weighted), while total
referred visits were 1,044 (35,132,494). For the purposes of this study we use a subset of
the total patient visits consisting of DM2 patient visits only for Aim 1 which after
weighting this represents 67,984,487, while for Aim 2 we analyze the total sample of all
PCP visits which after weighting represents 709,279,534 patient visits. (See Table 3.3)
Table 3.3 Power and sample size for Aim 1 & 2
All sample (2014-2015)
Years

Unweighted

Weighted sample

sample
2014

12,392

239,377,069

2015

4,532

236,454,586

Total PC visits

29,434

709,279,534

Sample for Aim1
DM2 visits

1,254

47,374,354

Sample for Aim2
Referred

1,044

35,132,494

Non-Referred

8288

289,275,856

3.8 Sensitivity Analysis:
For Aim 1, we examined the sensitivity analysis for our sample based on payment
methods, we find the results are similar to the following: The regression results based on
39

the three models above showed that: For Model 1 (Based on FFS and CAP(mixed)
categories), Compared to physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by FFS,
physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by CAP are less likely to apply ADA
recommendations with statistically significant P-value. On the other hand, compared to
physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by FFS, physicians with mixed
revenue are more likely to apply ADA recommendations with P-value non-significant.
For Model 2 (Based on CAP categories), compared to physicians with less than 25% of
patients covered by CAP, physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by CAP are
less likely to apply ADA recommendations, P-value statistically significant. On the other
hand, compared to physicians with less than 25% of patients covered by CAP, physicians
with 25%-75% of patients covered by CAP are more likely to apply ADA
recommendations, but P-value is not-significant. For Model 3 (Based on FFS
categories), compared to physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by FFS,
physicians with less than 25% of patients covered by FFS are less likely to apply ADA
recommendations, P-value statistically significant. On the other hand, compared to
physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by FFS, physicians with 25%- 75% of
patients covered by FFS are more likely to apply ADA recommendations, but P-value is
not-significant. We conclude that there is similarity among regression results for the three
models, which indicated that the sample we chose in our study is workable. (See Table
3.4)
For Aim 2, we examined the sensitivity analysis for our sample based on payment
methods, we find the results are almost similar as the following, The regression results
based on the three models above and as in Aim1 showed that: For Model 1 (Based on
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FFS and CAP (mixed) categories), physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by
CAP are more likely to refer patient to specialist compared to physicians with more than
75% of patients covered by FFS, the P-value is significant. Also, physicians under mixed
revenues are more likely to refer patients to specialist compared to physicians with more
than 75% of patients covered by FFS, but the P-value non-significant. For Model 2
(Based on CAP categories), physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by CAP
are more likely to refer patients to specialist compared to physicians with less than 25%
of patients covered by CAP with significant P-Values. Also, physicians with 25%-75% of
patients covered by CAP are more likely to refer patients to specialist compared to
physicians with less than 25% of patients covered by CAP with non-significant P-Values.
For Model 3 (Based on FFS categories), physicians with less than 25% of patients
covered by FFS are more likely to refer patients to specialists compared to physicians
with more than 75% of patients covered by FFS with significant P-Values. Also,
physicians who have 25%-75% of patients covered by FFS are more likely to refer
patients to specialist compared to physicians with more than 75% of patients covered by
FFS but P-value not significant. We concluded that there is similarity among regression
results for the three models too, which indicated that the sample we chose in our study is
workable. (See Table 3.4)
Table3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Model 1(Mix payment)
Categorical:
0 = More than 75% from
FFs
(Reference)
1 =More than 75% from
Capitation
2 =25%-75% from CAP
and FFS (mixed revenue)

Model 2 (CAP payment)
Categorical:
0 = less than 25% from CAP
(Reference)
1 =More than 75% from Capitation
2 =25%-75% from CAP
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Model 3 (FFS payment)
Categorical:
0 = More than 75% from FFS
(Reference)
1 =less than 25% from FFS
2 =25%-75% from FFS

Table 3.5 Distribution of the Diabetic Quality Matrix variable, by the total sample &
reimbursement category
DQM

Total sample

FFS

CAP

Mixed
payments

2

1.40%

0.00%

0.00%

1.40%

3

38,00%

24.50%

2.40%

11.10%

4

17.00%

11.40%

2.10%

3.50%

5

15.00%

9.60%

0.20%

5.20%

6

13.00%

10.00%

0.06%

2.94%

7

8.30%

4.50%

0.20%

3.60%

8

4.21%

3.09%

0.01%

1.13%

9

2.10%

1.30%

0.00%

0.80%

10

0.75%

0.30%

0.20%

0.25%

11

0.21%

0.15%

0.00%

0.06%

12

0.03%

0.003%

0.00%

0.00%

100.00%

66.07%

5.12%

28.81%

Total
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Table 3.6 Frequency distribution of the Diabetic Quality Matrix individual indicators, by
reimbursement category
DQM

FFS

CAP

Mixed payment

HbA1C

34.00%

14.00%

45.00%

Lipid profile

23.00%

12.00%

24.00%

Urine analysis

14.00%

12.00%

12.00%

Renal function

5.00%

4.00%

6.00%

Liver Function

21.00%

3.00%

20.00%

Liver Enzyme

2.00%

4.00%

2.00%

Thyroid test

10.00%

5.00%

12.00%

Blood Pressure

96.00%

100.00%

97.00%

Weight measurement

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Height measurement

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Retinal Exam

16.00%

18.00%

28.00%

Foot Exam

10.00%

16.00%

7.00%

Family planning

1.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Depression Screening

7.00%

3.00%

4.00%

Diabetic Education

15.00%

8.00%

11.00%
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CHAPTER 4 MANUSCRIPT 1
THE ASSOCIATION OF REIMBURSEMENT METHODS WITH
THE TENDENCY OF THE PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO
APPLY ADA RECOMMENDATIONS.
Abstract
Background:
One of the major concerns in healthcare is the increasing rate of diabetes Type 2
(DM2). There have been many efforts to improve healthcare quality and efficiency by
using various physician reimbursement regimes and incentives. We connected Agency
Theory with quality theory to measure how incentives affect quality of health care among
diabetic patients.
Objective:
Our objective in this study is to compare primary care physician (PCP) behavior in
response to payment method in the implementation of the American Diabetes Association
(ADA) recommendations on the management of DM2. We compare PCPs who are
mainly paid by patients under capitation (CAP) to PCPs who are mainly paid by patients
under fee for service (FFS) during outpatient physician office visits. We hypothesize that
PCPs whose patient mix is mainly covered by CAP plans will implement the ADA
recommendations with their DM2 patients at a lower rate than PCPs whose patient mix is
mainly covered by FFS.
1

Alharbi, A., Horner, R., et al. To be submitted to Journal of Health Economic
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Study design and participants:
The design of this study is cross-sectional, comprised of NAMCS data collected
and pooled during 2014 and 2015 for 1,253 DM2 patient visits to PCPs of patients older
than 18 years which is equal to 47,316,868 visits after weighting.
Main Measures:
The variables in our study are from the primary care visits description including
patients’, PCPs’, and payers’ characteristics. The outcome (dependent) variable in this
study is Diabetic Quality matrix, a continuous variable representing the number of
monitoring parameters that a physician provided to DM2 patients based on ADA
recommendations. The independent variable of interest in this study is reimbursement
method for PCPs which is a categorical variable where 0= physicians with more than
75% of patients covered by FFS, 1= physicians with more than 75% of patients covered
by CAP, and 2= physicians with 26% to 75% of patients covered by either CAP or FFS.
Results:
The estimated average of applying ADA recommendations for visits under CAP
is 0.5 recommendations less than for visits under FFS (P<0.05), controlling for other
provider, patient, and payer variables. Moreover, the estimated average application of
ADA recommendation for visits under mixed payment is 0.5 more than for visits under
FFS (P=0.09) with controlling for other provider, patient, and payer variables.
Conclusion:
We conclude from our results that PCP behavior is associated with the payment
methods in relationship to the evidenced based implementation of the ADA
recommendations for DM2 management. The evidence suggests that PCP practices
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whose source of revenue is mainly FFS provide more implementation of the ADA
recommendations compared to practices whose source of revenue is mainly CAP. Since
the use of ADA recommendations is linked to better quality of care for patients with
DM2 this implies better quality of care under FFS.
4.1-Introduction:
Diabetes mellitus Type 2 (DM2) is the seventh leading cause of death in the U.S.
with nearly 10% of the population diagnosed with DM2 [7]. Diabetes is costly not only
because of the disease itself but because of its association with many other serious health
problems such as heart disease, renal disease, glaucoma, and neuropathy [8,9,14-18].
Along with financial cost, diabetes reduces quality of life and increases mortality [7,14].
The economic impact of diabetes in the U.S., based on ADA data, shows the total direct
and indirect estimated cost of diagnosed diabetes in the United States in 2017 was $327
billion [52]. The healthcare system overall represents approximately 16% of GDP making
it the most expensive in the world without a commensurate level of quality of care [19].
Economists assume that payment systems influence the behavior of physicians
[1,2]. The challenge is to find the right combination of economic motivations that results
in the highest quality of care for the patient and greatest physician acceptance while
lowering costs. One intervention to support quality improvement is to directly relate a
proportion of the remuneration to providers to the achieved result on quality indicators
[85]. The traditional payment method that has been used in health care has been fee for
service (FFS) in which a provider is paid after performing a service and is paid for each
individual service. In previous decades, the prevailing payment method of FFS
incentivized physicians to increase services while creating an information asymmetry
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between providers, patients, and payers [32]. FFS may incentivize physicians to improve
the quality of healthcare for their patients to keep their patients satisfied with their
services [85]. CAP under which physicians are paid a fixed amount per time period, such
as per month, for each patient regardless of the services provided, may incentivize
physicians to provide fewer services and see more patients to increase practice revenue
[32] rather than to improve quality of care [85]. Based on economic theory, policy
makers and payers view CAP as one good alternative to shift physician reimbursement
away from FFS [3-5].
We have carefully reviewed other studies and have found that the literature does
not have a clear answer for whether healthcare quality is better under CAP or FFS among
diabetes patients in primary healthcare. American studies have focused on quality of
DM2 management and found that in general the level of monitoring is poor for diabetics
as a whole and even more so among Medicaid patients under CAP [54, 108]. Some
Canadian studies have found that patients on blended CAP programs and cared for in a
team approach had higher quality of care than those on blended FFS programs [8,9,53].
Based on the literature, it is clear that application of the ADA recommendations for
complete monitoring of DM2 patients in relation to payment methods is an important and
innovative area to study to improve outcomes of DM2, control costs, and to establish
policy recommendations. To our knowledge there have been no studies that have
assessed the quality of diabetic management by measuring the utilization of the American
Diabetes Association recommended monitoring and only a few studies that measure
quality in DM2 patients based on payment; most of the studies that exist are international
and not generalizable to the US system.
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We seek to provide evidence as to the association between payment method and
the quality of care provided to DM2 patients using the National Ambulatory Medical
Care Survey (NAMCS) data. We use Donabedian’s theory and Agency theory of
physician applying ADA recommendations as the conceptual framework to examine the
association of payment methods (FFS vs CAP) with physicians’ behavior in DM2 patient
management in outpatient care in the US. We are the first study to take this approach.
We hypothesize that PCPs whose patient mix is mainly covered by CAP plans will
implement the ADA recommendations with their DM2 patients at a lower rate than PCPs
whose patient mix is mainly covered by FFS.
4.2 conceptual framework:
The conceptual framework for this study adapts and simulates the idea from
modified Donabedian’s theory and Agency theory at the physician level rather than the
patient level. The Donabedian Model includes the Structure – Process - Outcome (SPO)
Model by Coyle and Battles [75]. We apply this framework to our questions through
evaluation of which health care services are provided for DM2 patients by measuring
whether the staff provides services based on evidence-based medicine.
The outcome for this study is the comparative frequency of the use of the ADA
recommendations in the visits of patients with DM2 between PCPs with mainly capitated
patients and PCPs with mainly of FFS patients. Coyle’s and Battles’ modified
Donabedian’s SPO Model suggests incorporating pertinent antecedents of medical care
into the conceptual framework for outcome assessment. Antecedents included in our
study are specifically physician characteristics, patient characteristics and payer
characteristics that can have an impact on SPO at the organization level [75]. Coyle and
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Battles’ modified SPO model guides the aim of this research by modeling how all three
elements of this model act and how physician characteristics and patient characteristics
relating to outpatient visits may influence these three elements. In addition, we use
Agency theory and connect it with the Donabedian Model by testing the relationship
between payment methods in terms of incentives (Principal-Agent relationship) with
quality (Donabedian); Agency theory is more applicable to health care cost as the
outcome and its relationship with behavior of the provider. Other studies have examined
each theory separately. One of our innovations in this study is to connect the two theories
together. According to Agency Theory, behavior and motivation are affected by financial
incentives [76]. There is a knowledge gap between the payers and the providers that
allows for suppliers to provide services in a different way. Under this theory, physicians
are the agents and payers are the principals. The principals desire an outcome that
minimizes costs created by the agents with the guarantee that providers provide highquality care [76]. The application of agency theory here is to compare the method of
reimbursement to PCPs in relation to utilization of healthcare services by assessing the
rate of implementing the diabetic quality matrix by PCPs paid primarily through CAP vs.
PCPs paid primarily through FFS. For patients under CAP, physicians are paid
irrespective of the cost incurred to treat the patient, meaning that the cost for some
patients will be lower than the monthly amount paid to the doctor and some will be
higher. Essentially, this fixed payment amount per patient spreads the risk such that it is
shared by the insurer and the physician unlike FFS plans in which providers are paid for
meaning there is no sharing of the financial risk in how providers treat patients with
chronic disease [77]. However, if the financial risk is too high for physicians, as in
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contract compatible incentives, agency theory suggests that payment methods may affect
utilization and the quality of care for patients, particularly patients with multiple chronic
conditions as many diabetics have [77]. (see figure 4.1).
4.3 Methodology:
4.3.1 Data Sources :(NAMCS data):
Our data are taken from the 2014 and 2015 National Ambulatory Medical Care
Survey (NAMCS), a national survey of office visits to private physicians throughout the
U.S. This survey is conducted annually by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) using multi-level
sampling at both the physician and patient level. It is a component of the National Health
Care Surveys, which measure utilization of health care services across a diversity of
healthcare. The survey produces weighted national estimates of office visits using a
multistage probability design with three stages of sampling; geographic, physician
practice, and patient visits. The first stage of sampling involves geographic area as the
primary sampling unit (PSU), the second stage is sampling of physicians in each PSU,
and the third stage consists of random sampling of patient visits to physicians’ offices.
The survey includes physicians of many specialties who may see ambulatory patients
except anesthesia, radiology, and pathology and the survey information was collected for
one week in physicians’ offices by either a physician or staff member. The survey itself
contains information on physician specialty, patient demographics, visit reasons, payment
methods, and other information. For our study we use visits to PCPs by patients with
DM2 during the survey week [79]. We combine all of the ADA recommended
monitoring testing into one quality matrix and pool the data for two years to increase
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sample size to increase the power of the statistical test since a larger sample size narrows
the distribution of the test statistic [80]. There are many studies using NAMCS data in
cross sectional studies as pooled data [81-84]. Weights are assigned to the sample visits
to obtain national estimates.
4.3.2 Measurements:
The unit of analysis is the primary care visit and, hence, the variables in our study
describe the patient’s, PCP’s, and payer’s characteristics associated with the visit.
Outcome Variable:
The outcome (dependent) variable in this study is Diabetic Quality matrix, a
continuous variable representing the number of monitoring parameters that a physician
provided to each DM2 patient based on ADA recommendations. The index ranges from 0
to 15.
Key Independent Variable:
The independent variable of interest in this study is reimbursement method for
PCPs which is a 3 category variable: 0= physician with more than 75% of patients
covered by FFS (referent category), 2= physician with 26% to 75% of patients covered
by either CAP or FFS, and 1= physician with more than 75% of patients covered by
CAP.
Control Variables:
As control variables, we included characteristics of patients, providers and payers
that are potential confounders of the association of payment method on quality of care.
Patient characteristics included categorical variables like age group, race, number of
chronic diseases, BMI, and insurance type. Binary variables like sex of patient, patient
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with hyperlipidemia, patient with hypertension, and new patient. Physician characteristics
included categorical variables like ownership status and geographical region, as well as
binary variables such as metropolitan status, and solo vs group practice. Payer
characteristics included a binary variable that was 1 if the payer considered quality
measurements in the physician’s compensation, 0 otherwise.
4.4. Statistical Analysis:
We use multiple linear regression for the survey (svy) data as follows:
𝑌 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽& ()*+,-._+,.0123 + 𝛽5 𝑋7 + 𝛽8 𝑋9 + 𝛽: 𝑋; + 𝜀
In this model, the dependent variable Y is the Diabetic Quality Matrix. Payment
methods is the main independent variable of interest: the reimbursement payment method
that is received by physicians for a majority of their patients. Confounder variables
include variables with subscripts P, D, and I which are defined at the individual doctor,
patient, and payer levels respectively. The vector of baseline characteristics Xd which
includes characteristics of the provider (at which patient p sought care) while, Xp,
includes characteristics of the patient. Xi, includes characteristics of the payer [see Table
4.1]. Finally, ε is an error term assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
Using a 3-step process, we analyze the data as follows. We give a description of
the dataset of the number, frequencies, percentages, and standard errors of the sample of
visits variables in the study [Table 4.1]. Then we estimate the mean of the main
independent variables among the total sample and three different kinds of payment
contexts and compare it with other independent variables in [Table 4.2]. Finally, we used
multivariable linear regression to analyze the data [Table 4.3].
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Given the nested structure of the data, we account for potentially correlated error
terms. We weight the data at patients' visits level within physicians’ clusters by using the
Stata command: svy, during the regression which provided variance matrix estimators
that ensure inference is robust to any within-provider correlation, alongside with using
the multiple linear regression model to study the relationship. Coefficients and 95%
confidence intervals (Cis) were obtained. We used Stata Statistics software, Version 14
for the data analysis. All tests are two-sided and a p-value <0.05 considered to be
statistically significant.
4.5. Results:
Results shown in Table 4.1 show the distribution of visits based on patients,
physicians, and payer characteristics for all visits and by our sample groups. The total
sample after weighting consists of 44,275,121 visits of which FFS represents 66.00% or
29,487,231; CAP represent 5.00 % or 23,023,306; and Mixed represents 29.00% or
12,839,785. Payment groups differed significantly on several characteristics of the visit.
Regarding patient characteristics patients under physicians who are mainly reimbursed by
CAP payments are more likely to be older than 60 compared to the other payment groups
(p<0.05). Sex under FFS and CAP is predominantly male while under Mixed payments it
is predominantly female (p<0.05). The racial distribution under FFS and Mixed payment
is majority white followed by black, but under CAP it is white followed by Hispanic
(p<0.05). Regarding physician ownership, FFS is characterized primarily by full
ownership but CAP is characterized mainly by physician employees (p=0.07). Regarding
payer characteristics, payers are most likely to consider quality measurements on
compensation under Mixed payment regimes then under CAP and least likely under FFS.
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Table 4.2 shows the mean application of the ADA matrix among the total sample
and three different kinds of payments in relation to the characteristics of the visits. The
mean of applying ADA recommendations is different between 2 payment methods and
the general sample as follows: the mean in the general sample is 4.59 (SD 1.7), in FFS is
4.57 (SD 1.8) and in CAP 3.98 (SD 1.5). The distribution of the mean of ADA
recommendations among different payment methods based on other independent
variables differ slightly. Regarding patient characteristics, compared to FFS and Mixed
payment, the means of applying ADA recommendation is lower under CAP among most
patient characteristics, such as in visits for patients who are older than 60 and female,
black and Hispanic. Regarding physicians’ characteristics, compared to FFS and Mixed
payment, means of applying ADA recommendation is lower under CAP among most
physician characteristics, such as in visits for physicians who are owner groups,
employees, and in non-solo groups and in visits for physicians who work in urban and
rural areas. Regarding payer characteristics, compared to FFS and Mixed payment, means
of applying ADA recommendation under CAP is lower for visits for which payer does or
does not consider quality in compensation.
Results from the multiple linear regression analyses are presented in Table 4.3.
The estimated average of applying ADA recommendations for visits under CAP is 0.5
recommendations less than visits under FFS (P<0.05), controlling for other provider,
patient, and payer variables. Moreover, the estimated average application of ADA
recommendation for visits under mixed payment is 0.5 more than visits under FFS
(P=0.09) controlling for other provider, patient, and payer variables.
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To assess the robustness of our findings, we ran the same model on selected
subsets our sample [Table 4.4]. New patients is a subset for whom the provider is most
likely to have limited information and, hence, would be motivated to gather as much data
as possible to understand the patient’s health status. When we restricted the sample to
new patients with DM2, we found similar results: visits under FFS receive ADA
recommendations at a statistically significantly higher rate than visits under CAP while,
visits under FFS receive the recommendations at a lower, but statistically similar, rate
compared to Mixed Payment. As another robustness assessment, we restricted the DM2
quality indicators to HbA1c which is the most useful indicator to understand whether the
patient has his or her disease under control [Table 4.5]. The results are the same as for
the total matrix; visits under FFS are more likely to report measurement of HbA1C
compared to visits under CAP. However, FFS is less likely – but not significantly so, to
measure HbA1c compared to mixed payment.
4.6. Discussion:
The goal of this study is to understand how financial incentives are associated
with the behavior of primary care physicians in the provision of care where financial
incentive is reflected by reimbursement type: capitation versus fee-for-service. Our study
examines the behavior of PCPs regarding the following of ADA guidelines for
monitoring of diabetes Type 2 (DM2) patients when one or the other of these payment
methods predominates among the physician’s patients. Our study found notable
differences showing a clear distinction in the behavior of PCPs with a majority of patients
under CAP vs FFS. Financial incentives experienced by PCPs have a relationship to the
intensity, quality, and cost of care that are provided to DM2 patients as measured in terms
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of ADA recommendations; accordingly, this leads to impacts on healthcare spending in
terms of a decrease in number of services under CAP and an increase in number of
services under the FFS model. This provides clues to a potential impact of cost constraint
in health care spending in the short term. Overall, patients who are mainly enrolled in a
FFS model were more likely to receive ADA recommended testing than patients enrolled
in a CAP model whether we included all diabetic patient visits or new visits of diabetic
patients. In addition, we found the same result when testing the impact of payment
methods on providing HbA1C as one specific quality indicator.
Our finding that reimbursement is associated with physician behavior and
utilization is consistent with Glazier, et.al (2009) which found decreased access and other
under-utilization for patients who shifted from FFS to CAP [69]; Gosden, et. al. (2001)
which found more continuity of care under FFS [1]. Others have also found that FFS
encourages utilization more than CAP and that it might even encourage overutilization,
[93-95]. Contrary to Sun’s 2016 study in China we did not find increased access for DM2
patients under CAP and contrary to a laboratory simulation conducted by Green (2014)
we did not find that DM2 patients under CAP received better quality of care than DM2
patients under FFS [70]. The mixed payment model was associated with higher rates of
implementing DQM indicators per visit than FFS, which may be for a variety of reasons.
According to Table 1, the mixed payment category has a significantly higher percentage
of payers who consider quality in payments which would induce more DQM indicators to
be performed. In addition, according to Table 2, the patient mix in the mixed payment
category has higher rates of conditions such as hypertension and hyperlipidemia as well
as chronic diseases which may account for an increase in DQM indicators per visit. A
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Canadian review found that mixed CAP provides lower utilization, but increased
preventive and other quality measures [112]. So possibly in our study, a mixture of CAP
& FFS induces higher quality. Eggleston conducted simulations using mixed payment
methods to determine the relationship of competition, financial reward, and
professionalism on both quantity and quality of services and concluded that the mixed
payment method was better for quality but that competition for patients who are looking
for quality in a PCP and professional ethics also play a role in physician behavior [113].
To analyze the relationship of mixed payments on quality measures requires further
research as we cannot definitively say from our study what the reasons are.
One article that studied health services research concluded that while we can
measure utilization rates, it is very difficult to determine whether utilization rates reflect
either the appropriateness of the care or the quality of the care [92]. Utilization only
measures quality indirectly because quantity of services used does not always equate to
quality. For instance, it is difficult to determine whether the level of utilization is an
increase in productivity, or it is supplier induced demand [96]. The challenge to
measuring quality is that there are many complexities, the first being to define “quality of
care” which will depend on perspective based on whether it is coming from providers,
patients, or payers [97]. The definition may encompass quantity, appropriateness of
utilization, patient satisfaction, outcome, and continuity. Patient behavior in compliance
with physician recommendations is an additional complication which is difficult to
measure. Our study measures quality by how closely physicians implement the ADA
recommendations such as the monitoring of HbA1C, in the management of DM2 because
these recommendations are designed to assure that diabetics receive the continuity and
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preventive care that will prevent complications and improve overall health. Regardless of
the complex nature of determining quality, it is an important area for continued study.
These findings have several policy implications. First, focusing only on
decreasing health care costs regardless of measuring and linking cost with quality
measures is a very critical point in health care. Constraining the waste of overutilization
in the provision of health care services is very important, especially in such a fragmented
and inefficient health care system such as the US has, relying on the free market that
commonly encourages supplier induced demand. However, that does not mean that
quality should be neglected as is clearly occurring as shown by our results of the CAP
payment method. Healthcare policies need to be set taking both quality and cost into
account instead of seeking to reduce costs alone.
Second, a loss or decrease in the quality of health care services and quality-based
reimbursement could have potentially devastating consequences for both health care
quality and spending. Sacrificing quality in the name of cost reduction will cost more in
the long run as prevention and management of DM2 and other chronic illnesses are
neglected and advance to more complicated conditions that are more costly to treat. The
best way to avoid this outcome is to increase spending at the primary care level which has
been shown to be most cost effective and efficient while at the same time providing
services that enhance prevention and better quality of health [105]. Policies that are
focused on cost reduction through CAP alone are being made at a time when many
institutions are already facing quality and financial challenges. For example, ADA data
shows direct costs of diagnosed diabetes rose from $176 billion in 2012 to $237 billion in
2017, however, true cost includes both direct and indirect spending on DM2, which
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increased by 26% from 2012 to 2017 from $245 billion to $327 billion which gives an
indication of how important it is to manage DM2 in such a way as to prevent
complications [51, 52]. Preventive care in the management of DM2 will improve both
quality of life and life expectancy but preventive strategies must be implemented in an
efficient manner to maintain cost effectiveness [106]. Because under CAP, more of the
financial risk is transferred to physicians, there may be less quality data being reported to
payers making it difficult for payers to compensate according to quality measures [107].
We need to innovate the reimbursement system to avoid driving PCPs out of practice at
the same time encouraging high quality care by the most cost-effective means. A better
method would be blending payment methods that gives more flexibility to CAP that takes
into account the care needed for more preventive and evidenced based management of
conditions such as DM2, encouraging for the implementation of ADA recommendations.
The best policies will be proposed by bringing together all stakeholders including
physicians because it cannot be solved by policy makers in isolation.
Third, Health insurance companies have a part in the process to begin to consider
quality measures in reimbursement. A reimbursement system that blends pay for
performance P4P with CAP that pays incentives for defined outcomes for chronic
diseases such as DM2 that is population based and encourages coordinated care could be
a system that would be acceptable to both physicians and patients [109]. Such a system
would reward physicians for innovation and cost saving while improving the quality of
life and life expectancy for DM2 patients. Currently under CAP and FFS, insurance
companies are not enforcing the ACA portion that mandates attention to quality. This
should become the rule in reimbursement methods so that the rationing or withholding of
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services does not happen. Patients must receive necessary health services, but
overutilization is not in the best interest of patients and the way to be sure that quality is
the first consideration is to insist on empirical evidence of quality outcomes. Measures
such as how well controlled diabetes is among DM2 patients and patient satisfaction over
time can be used to determine if the care is of high quality. We suggest an innovation to
the system that includes payment methods and quality improvements in the management
of DM2. From our evidence as well as the work of others we confirm that a payment
method intermediate to CAP and FFS appears to hold out the best chance for quality and
efficiency as our results show that mixed payment method provided the highest level of
quality measures even though the p-value was insignificant which could happen as a
result of weighting the data. The weighting of data can result in reduced accuracy due to
increased sampling variance as well as increased standard error and deviation [98].
Moreover, we recommend further research to assess specifically payment method
impacts on physician behavior in DM2 management for each recommended parameter
and how it affects patient health outcomes. Future research should focus on how the
constellation of ADA recommendations and comorbidities change when monitoring and
care are optimized.
We find from our results that PCP behavior is associated with the payment
method in relationship to the evidenced based implementation of the ADA
recommendations for DM2 management. The evidence suggests that PCP practices
whose source of revenue is mainly FFS provide more implementation of the ADA
recommendations compared to practices whose source of revenue is mainly CAP. Since
the use of ADA recommendations is linked to better quality of care for patients with
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DM2 this implies better quality of care under FFS. On the other hand lacking data on
health outcomes over time, because the NAMCS data is at the visit level for one week
only, we cannot draw a final conclusion about whether there is a qualitative difference in
patient clinical outcomes as a result of the provision of ADA recommendations between
the two payment methods. Future research should focus on how the constellation of ADA
recommendations and comorbidities change when monitoring and care are optimized.
Moreover, we recommend further research to measure specifically payment method
association with physician behavior in DM2 management to measure each parameter and
how it affects patient health outcomes.
4.8. Conclusion:
Relying on a Capitation payment system in primary health care would generate
the best cost savings for healthcare but may reduce the quality of health care among
diabetic patients. Maintaining a high quality of care for these patients is a very important
health policy priority since diabetes strongly impacts quality of life and cost because of
its complications. To ensure that capitated payments are supporting high quality care of
DM2 patients in primary care, we need to redesign and reform the payment system in
primary care and make payments highly relevant to quality measures.
4.9 Strengths and Limitations:
Our study has a high level of validity as there are many strengths in NAMCS data.
The NAMCS dataset is very large, national in scope, has many valuable variables, has
been used extensively in public health research (75), and has been found reliable for
many years (76). On the other hand, there may be some limitations. The data in the
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NAMCS is cross sectional; it is collected in one week of an office practice. Therefore, it
is possible that the snapshot of that specific week may not be representative of any given
practice. For our study we compensated for that shortcoming by using data from two
different years, 2014 and 2015 to increase the statistical power. Since we made our study
of many diabetes monitoring parameters and measured all of them in one quality matrix
variable, we did not compare every single diabetic monitored factor separately between
payment methods, however it is still important to know the general picture about the
impact of payment methods on quality. In addition, the NAMCS data does not have some
potentially important characteristics of the physician such as age, sex, training, or years in
practice and based on some articles those variables have an effect on the behavior of
physicians and their decisions (Franks, Peter, et al.200). The revenue variable we use
from the data is not 100 % FFS or 100 % CAP, but 76% or more which is sufficient to
represent predominant payment method for physicians. The completion of the practice
survey is voluntary, so it is possible that the offices that do fill out the survey are not
representative of all practices, physicians who reported for the week but did not see any
patients during that week are not included in our study. However, weighting the data at
the level of patient visits in the USA could resolve this issue and make it more
representative.

62

Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework – Quality Donabedian Model- Agency Theory
for applying ADA recommendations.
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Table 4.1 Distribution of patient, physician, and payer characteristics by total sample and
payment methods among DM2 visits in primary health care
Primary care visit characteristics
1-Diabetic Quality Matrix (mean)
2-Age (mean)
Age group
Adult<40
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex:
Male
Female
4-Race:
White
Black
Hispanic
5-BMI (mean)
BMI group
Underweight
Normal weight
Overweight
Obese
6-Hyperlipedimia
7-Hypertention
8- Total chronic diseases (mean)
Total chronic diseases group
1-3 chronic diseases
>3 chronic diseases
9-New-patient
10-Insurance type:
Private
Public
Worker’s Compensation
Other (Self -charity)
11-Owner status:
1 = Full owner
2 = Part owner
3 = Employee
4 = Contractor
12-Solo group
No
Yes
13-Metropolitan status:
Rural
Urban
14-Geographic regions
1 = Northeast
2 = Midwest
3 = South
4 = West
15-Consider-quality measurements
on compensation:

Total
FFS
Sample
4.20
4.57
Patient characteristics
63.69418
62.18167

CAP
3.98

Mixed
Payment
4.74

70.15786

65.5607

P-value

6.00%
30.00%
64.00%

7.00%
36.00%
57.00%

0.70%
14.30%
85.00%

3.00%
25.00%
72.00%

0.00

45.00%
55.00%

42.00%
58.00%

39.00%
61.00%

58.00%
42.00%

0.00

72.00%
20.00%
8.00%
32.90

75.00%
19.00%
6.00%
33.32

53.00%
13.00%
34.00%
30.02

69.00%
21.00%
10.00%
32.52

1.00%
14.00%
23.00%
62.00%
57.40%
74.55%
3.72

0.10%
14.00%
23.00%
62.90%
59.00%
72.00%
3.66

0.00%
21.00%
29.00%
50.00%
76.00%
74.00%
3.92

0.50%
15.00%
19.00%
64.50%
53.00%
74.00%
3.80

48.00%
52.00%
2.00%

49.00%
51.00
2.00%

41.00%
59.00%
1.00%

42.00%
58.00%
2.00%

40.54%
41.00%
44.60%
57.23%
58.00%
55.00%
0.61%
0.00%
0.00%
1.63%
1.00%
0.40%
Physician characteristics

35.00%
60.00%
2.00%
3.00%

38.00%
27.00%
34.33%
0. 62%

46.00%
19.00%
34.50%
0.50%

46.00%
4.00%
50.00%
0.00%

25.00%
46.00%
28.00%
1.00%

65.00%
35.00%

56.00%
44.00%

79.00%
21.00%

75.00%
25.00%

0.14

12.25%
87.75%

14.00%
86.00%

5.00%
95.00%

12.00%
88.00%

0.76

7.00%
5.00%
46.00%
42.00%

12.00%
17.00%
25.00%
46.00%

44.00%

55.00%

15.95%
19.00%
16.62%
19.00%
41.64%
45.00%
25.80%
17.00%
Payer Characteristics
26.54%
14.00%

64

0.02

0.41
0.26
0.64
0.50
0.70
0.62

0.07

0.12

0.00

Table 4.2 Means of application of ADA recommendations among the total sample and
payment methods by patient, physician, and payer characteristics
Primary care visit characteristics
1-Diabetic Quality Matrix (mean)
2-Age group
Adult<40
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex:
Male
Female
4-Race:
White
Black
Hispanic
5-BMI group
Underweight
Normal weight
Overweight
Obese
6-Hyperlipedimia
No
Yes
7-Hypertention
No
Yes
8- Total chronic diseases group
1-3 chronic diseases
>3 chronic diseases
9-New patient:
No
Yes
10-Insurance type:
Private
Public
Worker’s Compensation
Other (Self -charity)
11-Owner status:
1 = Full owner

Total
FFS
Sample
4.20
4.57
Patient characteristics

CAP
3.98

4.54
(1.08)
4.22
(1.41)
4.13
(1.28)

4.47
(0.99)
4.06
(1.27)
4.13
(1.29)

5.10
(3.0)
3.58
(0.72)

4.73
(1.24)
4.60
(1.44)
4.22
(1.33)

4.23
(1.31)
4.14
(1.31)

4.10
(1.28)
4.15
(1.26)

4.52
(1.95)
3.36
(0.55)

4.38
(1.25)
4.27
(1.50)

4.09
(1.37)
4.55
(1.05)
4.08
(1.25)

4.05
(1.28)
4.39
(1.15)
4.27
(1.39)

4.23
(1.82)
3.29
(0.33)
3.37
(0.45)

4.15
(1.49)
4.92
(0.81)
4.25
(1.30)

3.00
(0.00)
4.11
(1.20)
4.33
(1.49)
4.15
(1.26)

3.00
(0.00)
4.53
(1.18)
4.26
(1.28)
4.00
(1.26)

NA
(na)
3.61
(0.48)
4.63
(2.13)
3.43
(0.56)

3.00
(0.00)
3.47
(1.05)
4.41
(1.75)
4.50
(1.23)

3.98
(1.14)
4.33
(1.42)

3.90
(0.11)
4.28
(0.11)

3.92
(1.10)
3.78
(1.36)

4.11
(0.23)
4.54
(0.19)

4.14
(1.40)
4.19
(1.27)

3.98
(1.20)
4.18
(1.29)

4.55
(2.17)
3.56
(0.68)

4.43
(1.70)
4.30
(1.27)

4.20
(1.35)
4.16
(1.27)

4.13
(1.21)
4.13
(1.33)

4.12
(1.94)
3.61
(0.69)

4.35
(1.57)
4.30
(1.18)

4.16
(1.22)
5.00
(2.45)

4.11
(1.24)
4.80
(2.40)

3.82
(1.30)
3.00
(0.00)

4.31
(1.34)
5.50
(1.46)

4.31
NA
(1.27)
4.09
4.30
(1.33)
(1.21)
3.14
4.01
(0.26)
(1.30)
4.55
4.01
(1.62)
(1.21)
Physician characteristics

3.98
(1.68)
3.69
(0.83)
NA
3.00
(0.00)

4.39
(1.29)
4.29
(1.41)
3.14
(0.31)
4.95
(1.70)

3.71
(0.84)

5.13
(1.66)

4.24
(1.34)

4.04
(1.16)
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NA

Mixed
Payment
4.74

2 = Part owner
3 = Employee
4 = Contractor
12-Solo group
No
Yes
13-Metropolitan status:
Rural
Urban
13-Geographic regions
1 = Northeast
2 = Midwest
3 = South
4 = West
14-Consider-quality
measurements on compensation:
No
Yes
15-Consider-financialperformance on compensation:
No
Yes

4.11
(1.02)
4.15
(1.47)
4.71
(2.18)

4.24
(1.39)
4.18
(1.31)
4.27
(2.27)

4.92
(1.38)
3.84
(1.61)
na
(0.00)

4.01
(0.71)
4.17
(1.82)
5.16
(1.88)

4.17
(1.31)
4.20
(1.32)

4.24
(1.36)
3.99
(1.14)

3.71
(1.24)
4.21
(1.32)

4.15
(1.26)
4.99
(1.57)

3.91
(1.21)
4.22
(1.31)

4.13
(1.19)
4.13
(1.28)

3.71
(0.69)
3.82
(1.29)

3.36
(0.98)
4.44
(1.35)

4.20
3.94
(1.25)
(0.82)
4.10
4.26
(1.51)
(1.51)
4.32
4.20
(1.29)
(1.25)
3.99
4.00
(1.17)
(1.45)
Payer characteristics

4.95
(0.82)
3.69
(0.67)
4.03
(1.41)
3.43
(0.65)

4.90
(2.33)
3.73
(1.37)
4.69
(1.24)
4.06
(0.98)

4.16
(1.32)
4.22
(1.28)

4.10
(1.22)
4.29
(1.57)

3.74
(1.00)
3.91
(1.45)

4.42
(1.54)
4.23
(1.16)

4.25
(1.59)
4.16
(1.22)

4.22
(1.47)
4.09
(1.20)

3.48
(0.81)
3.84
(1.26)

4.35
(1.82)
4.32
(1.23)
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Table 4.3 Adjusted Coefficients of Multivariable Linear Regression Models
Demonstrating the frequency of implementation of Diabetic Quality Matrix by payment
methods (FFS vs CAP vs Mixed)
Independent variables
Reference
1-Payment Methods: FFS (reference)
CAP
Mixed (FFS + CAP)
2-Age group: Adult<40(reference)
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex: Male (reference)
Female

Coefficient

S. E

P-Value

0.22
0.31

0.03
0.09

(- 0.90 - -0.03)
(-0.08 - 1.15)

-0.64
-0.80

0.41
0.40

0.12
0.05

(-1.46 – 0.16)
(-1.61 – -0.01)

-0.30

0.12

0.01

(-0.54 - -0.06)

0.27
0.22

0.18
0.37

(-0.17 – 0.91)
(-0.62 - 0.23)

0.28
0.27
0.30
0.15
0.18

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.89

(0.53 - 1.64)
(0.91 – 1.99)
(0.29 – 1.50)
(0.43 – 1.06)
(-0.35 – 0.37)

0.20

0.89

(-0.38 – 0.44)

0.59

0.07

(-0.10 – 2.22)

0.19
0.54
0.51

0.29
0.02
0.25

(-0.61 – 0.16)
(-2.31 - -0.17)
(-0.42 – 1.61)

0.35
0.33
0.60
0.26

0.39
0.35
0.20
0.57

(-1.05 - 0.32)
(-0.95 – 0.34)
(-0.42 – 1.95)
(-0.67 – 0.37)

0.29

0.39

(-0.32 – 0.82)

0.36
0.33
0.29

0.72
0.44
0.28

(-0.84 – 0.58)
(-0.40 – 0.91)
(-0.89 – 0.26)

-0.24

0.29

0.39

(-0.82 – 0.32)

4.15

0.71

0.00

(2.75 – 5.55)

Reference
(1.00)
- 0.47
0.53
Patient characteristics

4-Race: White (reference)
Black
0.37
Hispanic
-0.19
5-BMI group: Underweight (reference)
Normal weight
1.08
Overweight
1.45
Obese
0.90
6-Hyperlipedimia
0.74
7-Hypertention
0.01
8-Total chronic diseases group: (1-3 chronic
diseases) (reference)
0.02
>3 chronic diseases
9-new patient
1.06
10-Insurance type: Private (reference)
Public
-0.22
Worker’s Compensation
-1.24
Other (Self -charity)
0.59
Physician characteristics
11-Owner status: Full owner (reference)
Part owner
-0.36
Employee
-0.30
Contractor
0.76
12-Solo group
-0.15
13-Metropolitan status: Rural (reference)
Urban
0.25
14-Geographic regions: Northeast (reference)
Midwest
-0.12
South
0.25
West
-0.31
Payer characteristics
15-Consider-quality measurements on
compensation:
Con

95%
confidence
interval
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Table 4.4 Adjusted Coefficients of Multivariable Linear Regression Models
Demonstrating the frequency of implementation of Diabetic Quality Matrix by payment
methods (FFS vs CAP vs Mixed)-New visits for Diabetic patients (837447)
Independent variables

Coefficient

Reference
1-Payment Methods: FFS (reference)
CAP
Mixed (FFS + CAP)

S. E

PValue

95%
confidence
interval

Reference
(1.00)
-4.43
1.55
2.38
1.00
Patient characteristics

2-Age group: Adult<40(reference)
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex: Male (reference)
Female
4-Race: White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
5-BMI group: Underweight (reference)
Normal weight
Overweight
6-Hyperlipedimia
7-Hypertention
8-Total chronic diseases group: (1-3
chronic diseases) (reference)
>3 chronic diseases
9-Insurance type: Private (reference)
Public
Other (Self -charity)

0.01
0.03

(- 7.82 - -1.03)
(0.18 - 4.57)

5.74
5.15

1.86
1.31

0.01
0.00

(1.67 - 9.81)
(2.30 – 8.01)

-0.27

0.76

0.72

(-1.95 - 1.39)

-0.50
-0.46

0.71
2.86

0.49
0.87

(-2.06 – 1.05)
(-6.70 - 5.78)

-3.14
-2.00
3.55
-0.4

1.43
1.08
0.82
1.05

0.50
0.87
0.00
0.67

(-6.29 - -0.04)
(-4.36 – 0.36)
(1.75 – 5.34)
(-2.75 – 1.85)

- 2.33

0.26

0.00

(-2.90 – -1.75)

-0.42
-5.86

1.04
3.57

0.65
0.12

(-2.76 - 1.80)
(-13.56- 1.91)

Physician characteristics
10-Owner status: Full owner (reference)
Part owner
-1.92
2.00
Employee
-1.84
1.49

0.35
0.24

(-6.29 - 2.43)
(-5.10 – 1.40)

2.24

0.32

(-7.19 – 2.58)

0.95

0.06

(-3.98 – 0.17)

2.75
2.81
2.67

0.85
0.53
0.88

(-6.54 – 5.47)
(-7.94 – 4.30)
(-6.20 – 5.43)

0.76

0.34

(-2.42 – 0.90)

1.33

0.00

(3.27 – 9.11)

11-Solo group
-2.30
12-Metropolitan status: Rural (reference)
Urban
-1.90
13-Geographic regions: Northeast
(reference)
-0.43
Midwest
-1.81
South
-0.38
West
Payer characteristics
14-Consider-quality measurements on
-0.75
compensation:
Con
6.19
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Table 4.5 Adjusted OR of Multivariable Logistic Regression Models Demonstrating the
frequency of provision of HbA1C by payment methods (FFS vs CAP vs Mixed)
Independent variables

OR

Reference
1-Payment Methods: FFS (reference)
CAP
Mixed (FFS + CAP)

S. E

PValue

95%
confidence
interval

Reference
(1.00)
0.20
0.10
1.74
0.75
Patient characteristics

2-Age group: Adult<40(reference)
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex: Male (reference)
Female
4-Race: White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
5-BMI
6-Hyperlipedimia
7-Hypertention
8-Total chronic diseases group: (1-3
chronic diseases) (reference)
>3 chronic diseases
9-new patient
10-Insurance type: Private (reference)
Public
Other (Self -charity)

0.00
0.19

(0.07 - 0.55)
(0.74 - 4.07)

0.58
0.67

0.36
0.46

0.39
0.56

(0.16 – 2.03)
(0.17 – 2.61)

0.55

0.11

0.00

(0.37 - 0.83)

2.51
2.70
1.01

0.92
1.00
0.01

0.01
0.00
0.53

(1.22 – 5.17)
(1.29 - 5.60)
(0.97 – 1.04)

2.40
0.83

0.49
0.18

0.00
0.40

(1.62 – 3.63)
(0.54 – 1.28)

1.12
1.52

0.31
0.87

0.69
0.42

(0.64 – 1.93)
(0.51 – 4.71)

0.57
1.90

0.12
1.18

0.00
0.34

(0.37 – 0.86)
(0.51 - 6.56)

0.25
0.23
1.22
0.34

0.21
0.13
0.50
0.89

(0.24 - 1.36)
(0.22 – 1.21)
(0.38 - 7.10)
(0.46 – 1.95)

0.44

0.72

(0.28 - 2.38)

0.65
0.69
0.47

0.77
0.36
0.72

(0.39 – 3.49)
(0.61 – 3.72)
(0.51 – 2.60)

0.21

0.19

(0.34 – 1.24)

1.27

0.92

(0.05 – 15.28)

Physician characteristics
11-Owner status: Full owner (reference)
Part owner
0.57
Employee
0.54
Contractor
1.63
12-Solo group
0.95
13-Metropolitan status: Rural (reference)
Urban
0.82
14-Geographic regions: Northeast
(reference)
1.17
Midwest
1.51
South
1.15
West
Payer characteristics
15-Consider-quality measurements on
0.65
compensation:
Con
0.87
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CHAPTER 5 MANUSCRIPT 2
THE ASSOCIATION OF REIMBURSEMENT METHODS WITH
THE TENDENCY OF THE PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO
MAKE REFERRALS TO SPECIALISTS.
Abstract:
We report on a study of the association of three reimbursement methods with patient
referral to specialists by primary health care physicians in the outpatient setting of the
United States: capitation, fee for service, and mixed payment. Specialist referrals are very
costly for the overall healthcare system and they have been increasing over the last few
decades. We used a cross sectional sample of outpatient visits to primary care providers
taken from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for 2014 and 2015.
We analyzed weighted data adjusting for patient, physician, and payer characteristics.
Our objective is to determine whether visits paid under capitation are more likely to result
in referral to specialists than visits under fee for service. We hypothesized that visits paid
under capitation would be more likely than visits paid under fee for service to be referred
to specialists to avoid additional costs of care. From the associated multiple logistic
regression model, compared to primary care visits that are under FFS plans, visits that are
under Capitation have 120% increased odds of referral visits to specialists (OR=2.30,
95% CI 1.10 - 4.42, P=0.01). We conclude that the type of primary care remuneration is

2
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associated with referral rates. It is not certain whether quality of health is associated with
rates of referrals, thus further research is needed on that question.
5.1 Introduction:
As healthcare costs continue to rise in the U.S, there is a need to find strategies for
containing costs while still delivering high quality care. Economists assume that payment
systems influence the behavior of physicians [1,2] and economic theory is used to seek a
way to shift physician reimbursement from FFS toward a more value-based system rather
than volume to maximize quality of care at the lowest cost [3-5]. As primary care is the
foundation of the healthcare system it is logical to begin to improve the quality of care as
well as to implement cost control by examining primary care providers (PCP) behavior in
response to payment method [7-9]. The decision to refer a patient has an impact on both
the quality and cost of the patient’s healthcare and as policy makers wrestle with cost
control in the future, they are likely to restrict the rate of referral, require justification for
referral, and require the use of a specific network provider [30, 64]. The decade from
1999 to 2009 saw rapid growth in referrals made to specialists by PCPs creating concern
over future spending [11]. In 2007 more than 50% of outpatient visits per year were to
specialists despite the frustration that both PCPs and specialists have with the referral
process [12]. Efforts such as incentives and disincentives to PCPs, limiting the number of
contracted specialists, and placing gate keeping on patients [13], so far have failed to halt
the increase in specialty referral. Therefore, a study of the effects of payment methods on
referral decision making is needed to determine the best way to optimize the rate of
specialist referrals.
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There have been a few investigations in the USA that studied referral rates to
specialists from a payment system perspective. A study by Zuvekas and Hill (2004) on
access under CAP, showed a difference in physician behavior depending on the contract
and the HMO model in which contracts requiring physicians to pay specialists when they
refer under CAP had fewer referrals, but that response depended on HMO type such as
“group/staff” more than on CAP to the individual provider [25] and Shea, et.al. (1999)
found that Medicare patients have double the referral rate per year of non-Medicare
patients [55]. However, these studies did not compare CAP vs FFS in the referral
decision and do not cover the same scope as our study. A few international studies have
examined referral rates and physician behavior, and although they are not generalizable
to the U.S., they are worth considering. Two Canadian studies by Sisera, et. al. (2018),
Liddy, et. al (2014) and a Norwegian study by Iversen and Lurås (2000) examined
referral rates and found that patients under FFS had significantly lower referral rates
compared to patients under CAP [90, 26, 27].
To our knowledge, there are no studies examining referral rates in relation to
visits paid under CAP vs FFS. Our study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by using
the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) data to assess physician
referral decision making behavior in response to FFS or CAP payment methods in
primary care patients in outpatient care settings in the U.S.
5.2 conceptual framework:
The conceptual framework for this study adapts and simulates the idea from
modified Donabedian’s theory and Agency theory at the physician level rather than the
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patient level. The Donabedian Model includes the Structure – Process - Outcome (SPO)
Model by Coyle and Battles [75]. One of our innovations in this study is to connect the
two theories together to apply this framework to our questions through evaluation of
specialist referral rates by measuring whether PCP office visits resulted in a specialist
referral.
Our outcome is the comparative frequency of referral of primary health care
patient visits to specialists between PCPs with mainly capitated patients, PCPs with
mainly FFS patients, and PCPs with mainly mixed payment patients. Coyle’s and Battles’
modified Donabedian’s SPO Model suggests incorporating pertinent antecedents of
medical care into the conceptual framework for outcome assessment. Antecedents
included in our study are specifically physician characteristics, patient characteristics and
payer characteristics that have an impact on SPO at the organization level [75]. Coyle and
Battles’ modified SPO model guides the aim of this research by modeling how all three
elements of this model act and how physician characteristics and patient characteristics
may influence these three elements. In addition, we use Agency theory and connect it
with the Donabedian Model by testing the relation between payment methods in terms of
incentives (Principal-Agent relationship) with quality (Donabedian); Agency theory is
more applicable to health care cost and its relationship to the behavior of the provider.
Other studies have examined each theory separately. The application of agency theory
here is to compare the method of reimbursement to PCPs in relation to utilization of
healthcare services by assessing the rate of specialist referrals by PCPs paid primarily
through CAP vs. PCPs paid primarily through FFS figure 5.1.
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5.3 Methodology:
5.3.1 Data Sources :(NAMCS data):
Our data are from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for
the 2014 and 2015 period; NAMCS is a national survey of office visits to private
physicians throughout the U.S. This survey is conducted annually by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) using multi-level sampling at both the physician and patient level. The survey
produces weighted national estimates of office visits using a multistage probability
design with three stages of sampling; geographic, physician practice, and patient visits.
The first stage of sampling involves geographic area as the primary sampling unit (PSU),
the second stage is sampling of physicians in each PSU, and the third stage consists of
random sampling of patient visits to physicians’ offices collected for one week. The
survey itself contains information on physician specialty, patient demographics, visit
reasons, payment methods, and other information. For our study we use patient visits to
PCPs during the survey week [79]. We pool the data for two years to increase sample
size to increase the power of the statistical test since a larger sample size narrows the
distribution of the test statistic [80]. There are many studies using NAMCS data in cross
sectional studies as pooled data [81-84]. Weights are assigned to the sample visits to
obtain estimates that are representative of national parameters.
5.3.2 Measurements:
The unit of analysis is the primary care visit and, hence, the variables in our study
describe the patient’s, PCP’s, and payer’s characteristics associated with the visit.
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5.3.3 Outcome Variable:
The outcome (dependent) variable in this study is a binary variable indicating if a
patient visit resulted in a referral to a specialist: 1= visit resulted in referral to a specialist,
while 0= visit did not result in referral to a specialist.
5.3.4 Key Independent Variable:
The independent variable of interest in this study is reimbursement method for
PCPs which is a 3-category variable: 0= physician with more than 75% of patients
covered by FFS (referent category), 2= physician with 26% to 75% of patients covered
by either CAP or FFS (Mixed), and 1= physician with more than 75% of patients covered
by CAP.
5.3.5 Control Variables:
As control variables, we included characteristics of patients, providers and payers
that are potential influences on the association of payment method on quality of care.
Patient characteristics included categorical variables like age group, race, number of
chronic diseases, and insurance type; binary variables include sex of patient, and whether
the patient is a new patient for the provider. Physician characteristics included categorical
variables like ownership status and geographical region, as well as binary variables such
as metropolitan status, and solo vs group practice. Payer characteristics included a binary
variable that was 1 if the payer considered financial performance in the physician’s
compensation, 0 otherwise.

75

5.4 Statistical analysis:
We use multivariate logistic regression on the survey (svy) data as follows:
𝑌 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽& ()*+,-._+,.0123 + 𝛽5 𝑋7 + 𝛽8 𝑋9 + 𝛽: 𝑋; + 𝜀
In this model, the outcome variable Y is the referral to specialist status of the
visit. Payment methods is the main independent variable of interest: the reimbursement
method that is received by physicians for a majority of their patients. Covariates include
variables with subscripts P, D, and I which are defined at the individual doctor, patient,
and payer levels respectively. The vector of baseline characteristics Xd which includes
characteristics of the provider (at which patient p sought care) while, Xp, includes
characteristics of the patient variables. Xi, includes characteristics of payer variables [see
Table 5.1]. Finally, ε is an error term assumed to be independently and identically
distributed.
Using a 3-step process, we analyze the data as follows: We give a description of
the dataset in terms of the number, frequencies, percentages, and mean and standard error
of the variables in the sample of visits (see Table 5.1). Then, we investigate referral rate
in the total sample and different kinds of payments separately against each of the other
independent predictor variables through using bivariate analysis or crosstabs procedure as
in Table 5.2. Finally, we used multivariable logistic regression to analyze the data as in
Table 5.3.
Given the nested structure of the data, we account for potentially correlated error
terms. We weight the data at the patient visit level within physician so that we obtained
variance matrix estimators that ensure inference of estimated regression coefficients is
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robust to any within-provider correlation. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals
(Cis) were obtained. We use Stata software, Version 14 for the data analysis. All tests
were two-sided and a p-value <0.05 considered to be statistically significant.
5.5 Result:
Results shown in Table 5.1 are based on NAMCS’s visits information, showing
the distribution of visits based on patients, physicians, and payer characteristics by our
payment method groups. The total sample after weighting consists of 295,340,841 visits
of which FFS represents 75.00% or 201,175,400; CAP represents 4.00% or 9,734,702;
and Mixed represents 21.00% or 84,430,739. Regarding patient characteristics, patients
under FFS, CAP, and Mixed payment are similar with relatively few statistically
significant differences. Payment method groups differ in their patients’ racial distribution.
The racial distribution under FFS and Mixed payment is majority white followed by
black, but under CAP, it is white followed by Hispanic (p<0.05). Regarding Provider and
Payer characteristics, there is no statistically significant difference between the three
payment groups.
Because of our interest in distinguishing referred visits to specialist among
payment methods, we further calculated within payment method, the percentage of
patients referred according to patient, physician, and payer characteristics using chisquare tests (Table 5.2). The distribution of referred visits among the total sample after
weighting consists of 31,295,654 visits of which FFS represents 62.00% or 19,528,164;
CAP represent 7.00% or 2,137,517; and Mixed represents 31.00% or 9,629,974.
Regarding patient characteristics, the racial distribution is significantly different for
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referred patients among payment groups in which under FFS the largest proportion of
referral are white while for CAP, referral are an equal proportion of white and Hispanic
patients and Mixed payment referrals have the highest proportion of black patients
(p<0.05). The chronic diseases distribution is significantly different among payment
groups in referred visits; while all payment groups referrals are predominantly those with
1-3 chronic conditions, among CAP referral, most of those are in the 1-3 category with
FFS and Mixed showing higher proportion of patients with more than 3 conditions
(p<0.05). Physician ownership is distributed significantly differently among payment
groups, in which FFS and CAP payments are characterized primarily by full ownership,
but Mixed payment is characterized mainly by partial owner physicians (p<0.05).
Referred visits distribution is significantly different between rural and urban areas among
three payment groups although FFS had a larger proportion of referrals from rural
practices (p<0.05). Referred visits is distributed significantly between regions in regard to
payment methods in which under CAP and Mixed payments the majority of referred
visits were in the west but under FFS the majority were in the south (p<0.05).
Results from the multiple logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 5.3.
Compared to primary care visits that are under FFS plans, visits that are under Capitation
have 130% greater odds of referral visits to specialists (OR=2.30, 95% CI 1.15 - 4.58,
P=0.01), controlling for other provider, patient, and payer variables. Compared to
primary care visits that are under FFS plans, visits that are under Mixed payment have
only a statistically insignificant 3 % greater odds of referral visits to specialists
(OR=1.03, 95% CI 0.66 - 1.62, P=0.85), controlling for other provider, patient, and payer
variables.
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5.6 Discussion:
The goal of this study is to understand the association of payment method with
referral decision making by comparing physician behavior categorized by CAP vs FFS vs
Mixed payments. Our study clearly demonstrates a difference in physician behavior that
is associated with payment methods. Our results show that visits covered under CAP are
more likely to result in referral to specialists than visits covered under FFS, confirming
our hypothesis. Our finding that reimbursement is associated with physician behavior and
utilization in terms of referral to specialist is consistent with previous studies. Canadian
studies by Sisera, et. al. (2018) & Liddy, et. al (2014) as well as a Norwegian study by
Iversen and Lurås (2000) also found that referral rates were higher among PCPs under
CAP than under FFS [26,27,90].
One of the factors that may explain this finding is that under CAP, PCPs are paid
a fixed amount per patient and the cost of treating a patient with complications outweighs
the compensation, the incentive is to refer to another provider, while under FFS, PCPs are
paid per unit of services provided incentivizing the PCP to provide more of the services
to patients with complications [26]. Moreover, one factor other than payment method
may explain the higher rates of referral for visits under CAP. Patients with 1-3 chronic
diseases predominate in the total sample in referred visits, as shown in table 5.2, and
patients under CAP have the highest percentage of 1-3 chronic diseases. This factor may
have an influence, since as reported by some studies, the main reason for specialist
referral is the medical condition of the patient [98-99]. Self-referrals may have a
confounding effect since in the U.S., FFS service insurance plans such as PPOs and
Indemnity plans allow patients to choose physicians without gatekeeping by PCPs.
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whereas patients under HMOs, which are primarily CAP, are required to receive a
referral from a PCP. These circumstances may account for the observed lower FFS
referral rates relative to CAP [114]. However, one study found that referral rates were not
affected by whether patients were under gatekeeping vs non-gatekeeping plans and after
removing referrals that were requested by patients, the authors found that visits under
CAP had higher rates of referral than visits under FFS [73]. While self-referrals eliminate
PCPs from the referral decision in some cases, there is no data to show exactly what
percentage that is. This is an important area for study to control costs associated with
referrals to specialists, but it will be necessary to distinguish referral attributable to the
PCP and self-referral by the patient.
This is the first study to compare specialist referral rates between PCPs whose
revenue source comes mainly from either CAP or FFS, applying Agency theory
combined with Donabedian’s theory, since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act in
2013. Our study does not provide a measurement of what rate of referrals are appropriate
or whether these referrals lead to better health outcomes for patients and future research
is needed on this subject, as very few studies have examined this aspect [100-101].
Previous studies have shown that quality is not easy to measure, and that utilization does
not equate to quality [92]. In the case of referrals, we can measure rates of referrals, but it
is more difficult to measure the appropriateness of the referrals and whether there is
supplier induced demand [96]. Quality of care suffers from both over and under referral
practices, for example according to Ghandi, et. al. (2006), 26% of malpractice claims
occur because of misdiagnosis when a referral was not given [110] On the other hand, if
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patients are referred for conditions that the PCP can manage, it results in higher cost to
patient and payer, unnecessary testing, and needless inconvenience[110].
Based on the difference in referral practices between CAP and FFS and based on
other studies we suggest several policy changes. First, mutually agreed standardized
guidelines for the decision to refer should be designed with input from all stakeholders
including physicians that incentivizes PCPs under CAP to avoid overutilization and PCPs
under FFS to avoid underutilization to achieve appropriate referrals and limit the
variation between practices due to payment method impact. For example, as suggested by
Chen and Yee, providers could use a protocol that indicates which conditions are best
treated by specialists [111]. Second, payment methods should be redesigned to encourage
changes in referral practices to ensure that the referrals are appropriate. A blended CAP
method that offers PCPs flexibility in treating patients with chronic disease without
having to refer out inappropriately due to the cost of seeing the patient outweighing the
reimbursement, would be more likely to succeed. The best policies will be proposed by
bringing together all stakeholders including physicians because it cannot be solved by
policy makers in isolation. Third, due to the fragmentation of care, the best evidence
based medical practice is missing because of the lack of coordination and communication
between specialists and PCPs [12], therefore funding technology to integrate medical
records and setting protocols requiring PCPs and specialists to share information to make
referrals could contribute to quality healthcare.
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5.7 Conclusions:
CAP and FFS payment methods have been demonstrated by our study to relate to
physician behavior in regard to the decision to refer to specialists. Future research should
focus on several areas. First, research is needed to measure the appropriateness of current
referrals. Second, research should be undertaken to establish guidelines and protocols for
a more evidence based and coordinated referral system. Third, innovations in technology
to allow better communication and record exchange between PCPs and specialists should
be pursued.
5.8 Strengths and Limitations:
Our study has a high level of validity because the NAMCS dataset is very large,
has many valuable variables, has been frequently used in public health research [102],
and has been found reliable for many years [103]. The NAMCS data is cross sectional
and collected for only one week of each practice which may not be representative of any
given practice. Our study is based only on primary health care visits, which might be
considered a limitation since we use only a subset of total patients seen. We compensate
for both of these shortcomings by using data from two different years, 2014 and 2015 to
increase the power of our study. Another limitation of our study is that the revenue
variable we use from the data is not 100 % FFS or 100 % CAP, but 76% or more which is
sufficient to represent the predominant payment methods for physicians. Since the
completion of the practice survey is voluntary, surveys may not be representative of all
practices. However, weighting the data at the level of patient visits in the USA resolves
this issue. The NAMCS data does not have physician age, sex, training, or years in
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practice, which have value in our study Finally, our study does not control for either selfreferrals or referrals made between specialists which is another limitation. Self-referrals
leave the PCP out of the equation which could happen more often under FFS plans that
permit patients to see specialists without a physician referral. Therefore, it may make FFS
referrals appear lower relative to CAP [73, 114].
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework – Quality Donabedian Model- Agency Theory for
Referral status to specialists.
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Table 5.1 The distribution of visits based on patients, physicians, and payer
characteristics by payment method groups.
Primary care visit
characteristics
1-Refer to specialist
No
Yes
2-Age group
Adult<40
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex:
Male
Female
4-Races/Ethnicity:
White
Black
Hispanic
5- Total chronic diseases
(mean)
Total chronic diseases group
No chronic Disease
1-3 chronic diseases
>3 chronic diseases)
6-New patient:
No
Yes
7-Insurance type:
Private
Public
Worker’s Compensation
Other (Self -charity)
8-Owner status:
1 = Full owner
2 = Part owner
3 = Employee
4 = Contractor
9-Solo group
No
Yes
10-Metropolitan status:
Rural
Urban
11-Geographic regions
1 = Northeast
2 = Midwest
3 = South
4 = West
12-Consider-financialperformance on
compensation:

Total
Sample

FFS

CAP

Mixed
Payment

Pvalue

89.00%
11.00%

90.00%
10.00%

78.00%
22.00%

89.00%
11.00%

0.15

22.00%
35.00%
43.00%

23.00%
36.00%
41.00%

18.00%
28.00%
54.00%

19.00%
33.00%
48.00%

39.00%
61.00%

40.00%
60.00%

37.00%
63.00%

43.00%
57.00%

0.38

79.00%
14.00%
7.00%
2.01
(1.7)

84.00%
11.00%
5.00%
2.03
(1.7)

57.00%
12.00%
31.00%
2.34
(1.6)

68.00%
21.00%
11.00%
2.08
(1.7)

0.00

23.00%
59.00%
18.00%

23.00%
59.00%
18.00%

14.00%
64.00%
22.005

21.00%
60.00%
19,00%

93.00%
7.00%

93.00%
7.00%

92.00%
8.00%

94.00%
6.00%

51.57
43.96
0.42
4.04

52.00%
44.00%
0.25%
3.75%

48.00%
50.00%
0.20%
1.80%

51.00%
44.00%
1.40%
4.00%

40.55
22.83
35.81
0. 81

40.00%
17.00%
42.00%
1.00

45.00
5.00
50.00
0.00

40.00%
35.00%
23.00%
2.00%

62.00
38.00

62.00%
38.00%

73.00%
27.00%

61.00
39.00

0.83

12.00
88.00

15.00%
85.00%

5.00%
95.00%

9.00
91.00

0.42

19.00%
22.00%
36.00%
23.00%
75.00%

19.00%
25.00%
38.00%
18.00%
75.00%

13.00%
7.00%
40.00%
40.00%
87.00%

19.00%
19.00%
25.00%
37.00%
78.00%
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0.28

0.77

0.83

0.64

0.10

0.29
0.66

Table 5.2 The distribution of referred visits among the total sample and payment
methods by patient, physician, and payer characteristics

Referral
Status:
1-Payment Types
2- Age group
Adult<40
Adult 40-60
Adult>60
3-Sex:
Male
Female
4-Race:
White
Black
Hispanic
5- Total chronic diseases (CD)
group
No CD
1-3 CD
> 3 CD
6- New patient:

7-Insurance type:
Private
Public
Worker’s Other (Self charity)
8-Owner status:
Full owner
Part owner
Employee
Contractor
9-Solo group
No
Yes
10-Metropolitan status:
Rural
Urban

11-Geographic regions
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

Total
sample
Referred
% or
Mean

FFS

CAP

Referred
% or
Mean

Referred
% or
Mean

Mixed
payment
Referred
% or
Mean

11.00%
31,295,654

10.00%
19,528,164

22.00%
2,137,517

11.00%
9,629,974

15.00%
38.00%
47.00%

18.00%
39.00%
43.00%

12.00%
38.00%
50.00%

10.00%
39.00%
51.00%

46.00
54.00

46.00%
54.00%

45.00%
55.00%

50.00
50.00

78.00%
16.00%
6.00%

84.00%
10.00%
6.00%

45.00%
13.00%
42.00%

64.00%
33.00%
3.00%

15.00%
53.00%
32.00%

15.00%
55.00%
30.00%

8.00%
70.00%
22.00%

13.00%
41.00%
46.00%

0.00

6.00%

6.00%

8.00%

6.00%

0.82

46.50%
51.00%
0.50%
2.00%

40.00%
18.00%
41.50%
0.50%

72.00%
2.00%
26.00%
0.00%

40.00%
36.00%
23.00%
1.00%

38.00%
27.00%
34.00%
1.00%

50.50%
47.00%
0.50%
2.00%

52.00%
45.00%
0.00%
3.00%

37.00%
62.00%
0.00%
1.00%

66.00%
34.00%

63.00%
37.00%

72.00%
28.00%

74.00%
26.00%

0.61

8.00%
92.00%

13.00%
87.00%

0.50%
99.50%

2.00%
98.00%

0.00

19.00%
16.00%
34.00%
31.00%

14.00%
23.00%
42.00%
21.00%

12.00%
1.00%
22.00%
65.00%

22.00%
11.00%
18.00%
49.00%

76.00%

76.00%

95.00%

77.00%

Pvalue

0.34
0.39

0.00

0.59

0.00

0.02

12-Consider-financialperformance on compensation:

86

0.40

Table 5.3 Adjusted OR of Multivariable Logistic Regression Models Demonstrating
referral rates by payment methods (FFS vs CAP vs Mixed)
Independent variables

OR

P-Value

95% confidence
interval

Reference

Reference (1.00)

0.01
0.85

1.15– 4.58
0.66 – 1.62

0.06
0.64

0.97 - 1.87
0.61 - 1.35

0.11

0.61 - 1.05

0.16
0.64

0.89 - 1.98
0.42 - 1.69

0.05
0.00
0.65

0.99 - 2.08
1.64 - 4.93
0.74 - 1.60

0.16
0.00
0.19

0.92 - 1.60
0.04 - 0.44
0.29 - 1.27

0.88
0.85
0.46
0.43

0.44 - 2.01
0.45 - 1.90
0.47 - 5.17
0.36 - 1.53

1.42

0.33

0.69 - 2.91

0.91
1.10
1.44
1.06

0.72
0.74
0.11
0.66

0.56 - 1.48
0.59 - 2.07
0.91 - 2.28
0.72 - 1.55

0.04

0.00

0.01 - 0.14

1-Payment Methods: FFS (reference)
CAP
Mixed (FFS + CAP)
2.30
1.03
2-Age group: Adult<40 (reference)
Adult 40-60
1.35
Adult>60
0.91
3-Sex: Male (reference)
Female
0.80
4-Race: White (reference)
Black
1.33
Hispanic
0.85
5-Total chronic diseases group: (No
chronic diseases) (reference)
(1-3) chronic diseases)
1.43
>3 chronic diseases
2.85
6- New patient:
1.09
7-Insurance type: Private (reference)
Public
1.21
Worker’s Compensation
0.04
Other (Self -charity)
0.61
8-Owner status: Full owner
(reference)
Part owner
0.93
Employee
0.93
Contractor
1.56
9-Solo group
0.75
10-Metropolitan status: Rural
(reference)
Urban
11-Geographic regions: Northeast
(reference)
Midwest
South
West
12-Consider-financial-performance
on compensation:
Con
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